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Abstract
Expert opinion has been, and still is, of undoubted assistance in the investigation of 
crime and the administration o f criminal justice. It has also been the cause of a 
number o f celebrated miscarriages of justice. Technological advances and greater 
investment in forensic science resources in the latter half of the 20 century meant 
that forensic science could be applied to many more cases than ever before. It also 
meant that forensic scientists had to meet new challenges in the way they formed and 
expressed opinions about their findings. The creation of a commercial market for 
forensic science in the 1990s in England and Wales put additional pressures on 
suppliers to provide value-for-money for their customers.
In an attempt to satisfy the potentially conflicting demands of providing robust, 
reliable opinion and o f giving value-for-money, a novel process called Case 
Assessment and Interpretation (CAI), based on the underlying logic of Bayes 
Theorem and the use of likelihood ratios, was proposed in 1998 as a model of good 
practice in forensic science. Over the course of the next 12 years, the model process 
was applied to most main-stream forensic science disciplines and, as a result, the ideas 
were refined and fresh insights on the nature of expertise were gained.
This thesis describes the background to the initial development of the CAI model, sets 
out subsequent improvements, demonstrates how the model may have helped avoid 
misleading opinion being given and considers the current status of CAI. The 
conclusion of the thesis is that assessment of likelihood ratios, within the framework 
of the Case Assessment and Interpretation model, does provide a philosophical, yet 
practical, means of delivering robust, reliable opinion and value-for-money.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The use of scientific techniques to assist criminal investigations and court proceedings 
is well established in many developed countries. These techniques range from 
relatively simple, observational techniques, such as the comparison of footwear 
marks, through to highly technical, analytical methods such as DNA-profiling. With 
the former techniques, experts tend to form their opinions from the subjective, 
qualitative data generated during the process of comparison of the attributes of 
reference and questioned samples. In contrast, the latter techniques present experts 
with large amounts of complex, quantitative and qualitative data generated from the 
analysis of the two sets of samples. Interpretation of the results of any type of 
technique requires expert skills that, by definition, are beyond the capability of the 
average lay person. While analytical techniques used in forensic science have 
developed extensively and rapidly over the last 30 years or so, forensic scientists and 
other experts have been much slower to change and improve their skills in 
interpretation of their findings. Furthermore, successful appeals against conviction in 
several high-profile criminal cases during this period were based on challenges of 
scientific or medical opinions that were seen as central evidence in the prosecution of 
the defendants. These cases posed major challenges to the forensic science 
community to improve not only the way in which experts formed their opinions but 
also the way in which opinions were communicated to lay people, police and lawyers.
Running alongside the issue of the nature and expression of expert opinion, the advent 
of a competitive market in forensic science in England and Wales in the 1990s forced 
forensic science providers (FSPs) to develop and deliver services that were more 
economic and more effective.
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This thesis describes the body of research and development work, collectively known 
as ‘Case Assessment and Interpretation’ (CAI), that provided the forensic science 
community with a means of dealing with the potentially conflicting requirements of 
providing robust, reliable, expert opinion while, at the same time, delivering 'value- 
for-money' to paying customers. The mechanism proposed to deal with this conflict 
was a novel application to forensic science problems of Bayes’ Theorem (Bayes 
1763), a logical means of dealing with uncertainty through the use of subjective 
probabilities.
It must be stressed that the research and development work that forms the basis of this 
thesis, and which is described in the appended papers, was performed by a team of 
scientists employed by the Forensic Science Service (FSS). The initial team was 
composed of ‘customer-facing’ managers (Phil Jones and Roger Cook), forensic 
statisticians (Ian Evett and Jim Lambert) and a forensic science practitioner (the 
current author, Graham Jackson) and was a unique combination of scientists with 
complementary skills, knowledge and experience. The composition of the team 
changed over the years to meet the differing challenges that arose from the different 
forms of cases and issues encountered but the current author and Ian Evett were the 
only permanent members of this team. The author was the leader of a national project 
for implementation and development of ‘Case Assessment and Interpretation’ within 
the FSS.
While it is difficult to attribute each novel development to specific individuals of the 
team, the author of this thesis will indicate at appropriate positions in the thesis his
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contribution to the body of work and, in particular, attention is drawn to the four 
appended papers for which the current author was the sole or lead author.
The hypothesis of the thesis is:
The evaluation o f  a Bayesian likelihood ratio p rovides a ph ilosophical and  
p ra c tica l m odel to accom m odate the po ten tia lly  conflicting requirem ents o f  
the crim inal ju stice  system  fo r  reliable, useful, expert opinion and o f  
custom ers fo r  economic, expert services.
The Chapters of this thesis introduce and discuss, from an historical perspective, the 
natural phases of the development of the application of Bayes’ Theorem in forensic 
science as described and proposed in the published papers to which this author 
contributed. Each Chapter deals with either a single published paper or a group of 
papers that form a common theme. Copies of the papers can be found in Appendices 
organised according to the themes of the Chapters.
The thesis is written from an historical viewpoint and, therefore, the tense used for the 
thesis is the past tense, even though the work described in the papers is still relevant 
and applicable to current forensic science practice.
The following provides an overview of the content of the Chapters.
A review of the state of forensic science from the early 1970s to the mid 1990s is 
provided in Chapter 2. During this critical period, the contribution and impact of 
forensic science within the criminal justice system increased markedly. As a
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consequence, the evidence provided by forensic scientists and other experts was 
subjected to increasing challenge and scrutiny by the courts. In a number of high- 
profile cases, expert opinion was given that contributed directly to miscarriages of 
justice. These cases dented the previously-held impression that forensic science was 
highly reliable. The use of a likelihood ratio (LR), a key component within the 
framework provided by Bayes’ Theorem, was advocated during this period by a few, 
key forensic statisticians as a means o f providing a logical, safer approach to the 
interpretation of scientific evidence (e.g. Finkelstein and Fairley 1970, Lindley 1977, 
Evett 1983). However, assessment of likelihood ratios as a means of appraising 
weight o f scientific evidence was not embraced enthusiastically or comprehensively 
by practitioners.
Also during this period, a number of governmental reviews of the arrangement of 
forensic science in England and Wales were commissioned, e.g. Touche Ross (1987). 
These reviews found that the way in which forensic science was organised and 
delivered was poorly connected to the requirements o f law enforcement and criminal 
justice agencies. The ’supply' of forensic science did not meet the perceived ’demand’ 
for forensic science services. Proposals for the re-organisation of the provision of 
forensic science in England and Wales were subsequently implemented in the early 
1990s.
Chapter 3 focuses solely on the first paper (Cook et al. 1998a) in the body of work 
that forms the basis of this thesis. This paper introduced the notion that integration of 
evaluation of likelihood ratios into the structure of an operating framework would 
provide a robust, useful model for assessing the needs of a case as well as for
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interpreting scientific findings. The resulting framework was called the 'Case 
Assessment and Interpretation (CAI)’ model.
As a result of experience gained in applying the CAI model to real-life cases, greater 
understanding of the model's strengths and limitations was achieved and various 
refinements and developments to the model were proposed and reported in a group of 
three papers. Chapter 4 is based on this body of work and begins with a paper by 
Cook et a l  (1998b) that introduced the novel notion of a 'hierarchy of propositions’ 
that helped to clarify the precise contribution of the forensic science evidence in any 
one particular case. The important philosophical distinction between 'propositions' 
and 'explanations' was developed in a subsequent paper by Evett, Jackson and 
Lambert (2000). These two papers, combined with the first paper on the CAI model, 
presented an overarching structure that helped forensic scientists deliver to the 
criminal justice system a more relevant, more transparent and more robust service 
than ever before. The distinction that was drawn between propositions and 
explanations suggested that there were conceptually and practically different roles for 
forensic scientists operating either as 'evaluators' or as 'investigators' -  a theme that 
was developed in later papers (Chapter 8). The implications of applying the CAI 
model in so-called 'two-way' transfer cases were explored by Cook et al. (1999). This 
paper provided, firstly, a rationale for making better decisions on what to examine 
within individual cases and, secondly, a better approach to evaluating the combined 
weight of different pieces of evidence.
Chapter 5 deals with the communication of forensic science findings through written 
statements and reports of evidence. The paper by Evett et al. (2000a) provided
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guidance on how statements of evidence could be influenced by the underlying 
principles of CAL The authors argued that the natural flow of the CAI model could be 
translated directly to the structure and content o f a statement.
Chapter 6 describes the application of CAI thinking to two specific evidence types. 
DNA-profiling was introduced to courts o f law in the late 1980s and, initially, 
interpretation of DNA results centred largely on estimation of a relative frequency of 
occurrence of the matching DNA profiles. Evett et al. (2002) applied the CAI model, 
and its probabilistic approach, to help move forward the style of interpretation. The 
authors also introduced the application of Bayesian networks to model the complex 
uncertainties involved in many DNA cases. Booth, Johnston and Jackson (2002) 
described an application of CAI to cases involving a specific type of drugs 
examination. Most drugs cases involve relatively straightforward identification and 
quantification of drugs but a small number of cases involve issues of 'supplying' illicit 
drugs. Applying the CAI model to such cases helped provide an exemplar approach 
to interpreting the findings in this type of case.
A vitally important area in forensic science is the collection and analysis of relevant 
data to inform interpretation. The paper by Champod, Evett and Jackson (2004), 
described in Chapter 7, provided a novel analysis of the type of data required in cases 
where the issue was the source of a piece of recovered material and where evidential 
value would be based largely on the frequency of occurrence o f the material. 
Historically, the type o f sample that was collected to provide estimates of frequencies 
of occurrence were usually so-called 'convenience' samples - samples that were 
readily and easily available. However, such samples may not be appropriate or
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relevant to the issue being addressed and, as such, would not provide a robust 
representation of the frequency of occurrence. This paper provided guidance on the 
collection and construction of more appropriate data sets.
During the period from its initial development to the present date, the CAI model has 
been applied with varying degrees of success across all mainstream disciplines of 
forensic science. From that experience, fresh insights were gained about the nature of 
forensic science opinion, leading to a deeper understanding of the skills and 
knowledge required of a competent forensic practitioner. These aspects were 
explored in the three papers presented in Chapter 8. Jackson (2000) explored the 
newly-evolving concept of the role of the expert and compared that with an approach 
that had not changed greatly for at least the previous 40 years. Jackson et al. (2006) 
and Jackson (2009) continued to develop the notion of a distinction between the 
scientist operating in two subtly different roles, ‘investigative’ and ‘evaluative’, based 
on the philosophical basis of the type of opinion being offered. This gave fresh 
insights into the skills and knowledge required of forensic scientists.
Chapter 9 presents a paper by Jackson and Jones (2009) that reviewed the current 
status of the application of Case Assessment and Interpretation (CAI) within the 
Criminal Justice System and argued that forensic science practitioners cannot apply 
CAI thinking and actions in isolation, in a so-called ’black box’ approach. For the 
greatest benefit to be gained, CAI has to be applied with the knowledge and 
engagement of all parties who commission, deliver and use forensic science within the 
Criminal Justice System. Without this engagement, CAI is a pointless exercise. The 
paper described some of the changes that are necessary within and between the
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domains of forensic scientists, investigators and legal practitioners in order to achieve 
the perceived benefits of CAI.
Chapter 10 summarises the basics steps of Case Assessment and Interpretation and, 
by applying them to the stated Court of Appeal cases described in Chapter 2, 
demonstrate the difference that CAI may have made to these cases. The current status 
of CAI in today’s judicial process in England and Wales is highlighted through a 
discussion of two recent cases in which the application of CAI was a central issue in 
court.
In the final Chapter, a conclusion is drawn on the central hypothesis of the thesis.
It should be noted that this thesis concentrates largely on the criminal justice system 
of the English and Welsh jurisdiction, this being the main domain of experience of the 
author. However, the principles described in the thesis can apply to any jurisdiction 
and, while decisions in one jurisdiction are not binding elsewhere, courts can, and do, 
take note of significant, relevant decisions from other countries.
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Chapter 2: Background - the state of forensic science from 1970 to 
1995
2.1 Expert opinion
In most of the cases in which expert opinion is provided in the form of written 
statements or reports, the expert witness does not attend court to provide oral 
evidence. There will be various reasons for this, including 
- there was no suspect
there were no proceedings against the suspect or defendant 
the defendant pleaded guilty
the expert’s evidence provided no assistance to the court 
the defence accepted the expert evidence
In a small proportion of cases, the expert does attend court and gives evidence in 
person. For the vast majority of these cases, there are no adverse repercussions from 
these appearances. Very few cases, relative to the total number that utilise forensic 
science, make the headlines in the reporting media and rarely does a convicted person 
appeal against the conviction on the grounds of misleading expert evidence. This may 
be taken as an indication of the robustness of expert opinion. On the other hand, an 
opposing view could argue that, because there is a compliant, unchallenging 
acceptance of the apparent strength and reliability of expert opinion, only a very small 
number of cases are ever challenged effectively. The recent report by the Law 
Commission of England and Wales (2011) highlights the ‘current la issez-fa ire’ 
acceptance of expert opinion evidence (page 4, 1.17).
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What is undisputed is that, in a small number of high-profile cases, expert opinion 
was an important part of the prosecution case and that subsequent, successful appeals 
against conviction were based on the proposition that misleading expert opinion 
evidence had been given at the original trials.
The convictions of John (Jack) Preece, Judith Ward, the 'Birmingham Six', and Stefan 
Kiszko for crimes committed in the 1970s were dependent to a large extent on the 
perceived strength of scientific evidence presented at trial. The subsequent success of 
the appeals against conviction of each of these defendants in the 1980s and 90s was in 
no small part due to the appellants’ lawyers challenging misleading scientific 
evidence, although non-scientific issues did also play a part in each of these cases. 
Unreliable expert opinion can be the result of poor scientific knowledge or lax 
application of scientific techniques. However, it can be argued that the more 
significant part of the problem is the way in which experts make inferences from their 
findings and express their opinions. Communication is a two-way process which, to 
be successful, relies on good ‘transmission’ as well as good ‘reception’ of the 
message. As such, the way in which expert opinions are understood and subsequently 
used, or misused, by the prosecution, defence and jury is also a significant part of the 
problem.
2.2 Stated cases at the English and Welsh Court of Appeal
2.2.1 The case of John (Jack) Preece1
In 1972, Jack Preece was convicted of the murder by strangulation of a woman in the 
cab of his lorry in Scotland. At his trial, scientific evidence relating to the analysis
1 P r e e c e  v H M A d v o c a t e  Criminal Law Review 1981; 783.
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and comparison of body fluids, fibres, hairs and other material was presented by 
forensic scientist Dr Alan Clift. No-one can say precisely what the impact his 
evidence had on the jury's decision but it seems reasonable to assume that it added 
significant weight to the prosecution’s case against Mr Preece. In 1981, after 
questions were raised over the reliability of Dr Clift's evidence, the case was referred 
to the Court of Appeal. New evidence was presented at this hearing about Dr Clift's 
analysis of semen stains in the case and his subsequent interpretation of the results. In 
particular, the court heard that the victim and the defendant shared the same 
bloodgroup type and there was doubt that, contrary to Dr Clift's evidence, it was not 
possible in this case to distinguish the contribution to the analytical results of the 
female victim from that of the male offender (whomever he may have been). The 
Court of Appeal ruled:
...th at h ad  the ju ry  heard  the new evidence they must have fo u n d  D r  C to be  
discred ited  as a scientific w itness and that accordingly the whole o f  the 
scientific evidence he gave w ould  have been regarded  as unreliable; and the 
appeal must be a llow ed  and the conviction quashed.2
There are issues in this case about the role of prosecution and defence lawyers in 
teasing out the strengths and weaknesses of scientific evidence. For example, it could 
be argued that both prosecution and defence, for different reasons, failed to help the 
court arrive at a fair decision on Mr Preece. Prosecution failed to ask the witness 
whether the bloodgroup of the victim was of the same type as the defendant. For its 
part, the defence failed to challenge the basis o f Dr Clift's opinion that it was possible 
to differentiate the victim's body-fluid components from those of the offender.
2 P r e e c e  (n 1) 784.
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However, a key issue remained in this case -  what is the duty of the expert witness in 
such cases and how should they discharge that duty? Commenting on the case, 
Brownlie refers to earlier authorities:
The law's requirem ents o f  an expert have hitherto been that he shall g ive  his
eviden ce ......  in a  fa ir  and  unbiased manner making a fu ll and  fran k
disclosure so  as to p ro v id e  the court with the m aterial necessary to enable it to 
com e to a reasoned decision on the merits o f  the scientific issue -  D avie  v. 
M agistrates o f  Edinburgh, 1953 S.C. 34?
and, quoting Sir Roger Ormerod:
It should be a rigorous obligation on a ll experts to g ive  the court as c learly  as 
they can the lim its o f  accuracy o f  their evidence, whether it is experim ental or  
theoretical, and to disclose, i f  it be the fact, that other view s exist in their 
profession. It should a lso be their duty to the court to indicate w hat inferences 
cannot be drawn from  their evidence. 3 4
According to Brownlie:
F or the f ir s t  tim e it appears that the High Court is spelling out the suprem e  
requirem ents fo r  the expert, nam ely that he shall not only g ive  his evidence to 
the best o f  his ability  but a lso supply a critique o f  that evidence draw ing  
attention to its weaknesses as w ell as its strengths.5
These authorities did give useful guidance to experts on how to present opinion but 
they fell short of providing a unifying conceptual framework. For example, exactly
3 P r e e c e  (n 1) 784
4 S c i e n t i f i c  E v i d e n c e  in  C o u r t  [1968] Crim.L.R. 240.
5 P r e e c e  (n 1) 785.
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how should experts give evidence in an unbiased manner? What mechanism would 
direct experts to think and operate in an unbiased manner; how can experts 
demonstrate that they are doing that? In relation to the enjoinder 'to d isclose ... other 
view s', it is almost certain there will be at least one other view, however unreasonable 
or fanciful, somewhere in the world. How can the expert know of all other views? 
And, finally, how does the expert decide what are the strengths and weaknesses of his 
evidence -  how are strengths and weaknesses defined?
2.2.2 The case of Judith Ward6 7
Judith Ward was convicted in 1974 of several offences including that of causing an 
explosion which killed 12 people on a coach on the M62. A major plank of the 
prosecution case was evidence presented by a number of scientists that suggested Ms. 
Ward had had involvement with the handling of explosives. She herself had made 
certain admissions on this but her Defence contended later that those confessions were 
untrue. Judith Ward appealed the conviction and, at the subsequent hearing at the 
Court of Appeal in 1992, her conviction was quashed. In a report of the judgment, the 
Court comments on the scientific evidence and, in relation to the overall impact of this 
evidence, said:
Given that the appellan t denied that she had been in contact with explosives, 
the scientific evidence led  by the prosecution  struck a t the heart o f  the 
appellan t's credibility. To the ju ry , a com bination o f  her confessions and the 
supporting scientific evidence linked with a ll three explosions w ould have 
seem ed com pelling p r o o f  o f  a p p e lla n t’s gu ilt.1
6 R  v  W a r d  [1993] 1 WLR 619.
7 ibid 664.
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One of the scientists who presented evidence at her trial, the late Dr Frank Skuse, had 
taken swabs from Ms. Ward's hands and from under her fingernails. He tested these 
for the presence of chemical components of explosives and he obtained positive 
reactions. Again, quoting from the judgment:
D r S ku se’s statem ent is d a ted  February 25, 1974. I t w as served  on the 
defence and used a t the com m ittal proceedings. The relevant p a r t o f  the 
statem ent reads:
‘A positive  colour reaction fo r  a substance sim ilar to n itroglycerine has been 
obtained from  each o f  the sw abs FS3 and FS4 [fingernail scrapings] and item  
47 [the ring]. N o confirm atory test fo r  nitroglycerine w as obtained from  these 
swabs. N egative tests fo r  ammonium and nitrate were obtained from  these 
swabs. The examination o f  these items is consistent with the opinion that 
contact o f  the hands with an explosive substance could have occurred. Item  
45 is a brown fa b r ic  bag [the duffle bag] f it te d  with a string grip. The bag  
and grip  were sw abbed  and p ositive  colour reactions w ere obtained fo r  a 
substance sim ilar to nitroglycerine and ammonium ion a p a r t com ponent o f  
ammonium nitrate. N o confirm atory tests f o r  nitroglycerine and ammonium  
ion w ere obtained. A negative test fo r  nitrate was obtained from  these swabs. 
The examination o f  these items is consistent with the opinion that contact o f  
the inside o f  the bag  and com m ercial explosive has probab ly  occurred. ’
This was not an unfair summary o f  the view  which D r Skuse apparently held. 
But it is noteworthy that a t the tria l D r S ku se’s evidence becam e m ore positive
14
in his insistence on w hat he believed  to be the correct inferences to be drawn  
from  his tests. 8
For the sake of brevity, it is not the intention here to describe or discuss the remaining 
scientific evidence in this case, even though that was of considerable significance in 
the original trial and the subsequent Court of Appeal hearings. Consideration of Dr 
Skuse's evidence alone should suffice to illustrate the issues, particularly, as evidence 
from the same scientist occurs in the subsequent case example o f the 'Birmingham 
Six'.
Turning to the evidence presented by Dr Skuse at the original trial, the Court says:
D r S ku se’s evidence w as along the lines o f  his witness statement. H e insisted  
that his G riess test results sh ow ed that M iss Ward h ad  prob a b ly  been in 
contact with a com m ercial explosive. H e also testified that a T.L.C. test o f  a 
sw ab taken under the left fin gern ail reinforced his view  despite  the fa c t  that 
the suspect sp o t d id  not turn p in k  or anything like it. H e w as cross-exam ined  
on these p o in ts  but refused to budge. I f  the ju ry  chose to accept D r S ku se’s 
evidence, as they prob a b ly  did, it fo llo w ed  that M iss W ard had N. G. on her 
person  som e 57  hours after the explosion a t Latim er.9
and later:
The prosecu tion  d id  not call D r Skuse to g ive  evidence before us. But there is 
before us an im pressive body o f  expert opinion to the effect that D r  S ku se’s 
tests, notw ithstanding his confident assertions a t the trial, w ere o f  no value in
8 W a r d  (n 6) 668.
9 ibid 673.
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establish ing contact between the appellant and the explosives in 1974. The 
fa c t  that D r  Skuse apparently g o t the G riess test result, which he described, 
cannot be regarded  as m ore than an initial step  tow ards the identification o f  
NG: it w as not evidence o f  the presence o f  NG. D r Skuse relied  on one TLC  
test spot, despite the fa c t  that it w as not pink. It is established to our 
satisfaction that this conclusion w as wrong. The scientific evidence before us 
fu rth er show s that the interval o f  som e 5 7 hours between the a lleged  handling  
o f  explosives a t Latim er and the taking o f  sam ples by D r Skuse rendered  
unlikely the suggestion o f  the presen ce  o f  explosives on M iss W ard’s hands as 
a result o f  p lan ting  explosive devices. M oreover, the very fa c t  that the TLC  
test d id  not w ork pu ts a substantial question mark over the conditions o f  the 
prelim inary G riess test. In our judgm ent, i f  the trial ju d g e  had known w hat we  
know, he w ould  have excluded D r S ku se’s evidence as valueless. D r S ku se’s 
conclusion w as wrong, and dem onstrably wrong, ju d g e d  even by the sta te  o f  
fo ren sic  science in 1974.
That brings us to the im pact o f  D r S ku se’s evidence on the trial o f  M iss Ward. 
In many w ays D r Skuse w as the m ost im portant scientific w itness ca lled  by the 
prosecution. H e w as after a ll the only fo ren sic  scien tist who professed  to have 
fo u n d  N G  under M iss W ard’s  fingernails. That evidence enabled M r H iggs to 
say that M iss Ward must have kneaded explosives. The elimination o f  D r  
S ku se’s evidence is therefore an im portant m atter.10
And, finally:
10 Ward (n 6) 677.
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A careful study o f  the fresh  scientific evidence has p ersu aded  us that the 
scientific case against M iss W ard is now insupportable. In our ju dgm en t on 
this fu rth er ground M iss W ard’s conviction is unsafe and unsatisfactory.11
Judith Ward's convictions on all counts were quashed.
This case provides a good example of what may have been a prevailing approach 
amongst forensic scientists at the time. In Dr Skuse’s written evidence for the original 
trial, he uses the phrases such as '... consistent with the opinion that contact o f  the 
hands with an explosive substance could have occu rred  and '...consistent with the 
opinion that contact o f  the inside o f  the bag  and com m ercial explosive has p rob a b ly  
occurred'. However, in his oral evidence to the court, if  the reporting in the judgment 
is correct, he increases the weight, and therefore the impact, of his evidence by saying 
or implying th a t'... results show ed that M iss Ward had prob a b ly  been in contact with  
a com m ercial explosive'.
The scientist has progressed from what may be interpreted as a relatively mild opinion 
of 'consistent with an opinion that contact could have occurred...' to a much stronger 
opinion o f '... h ad  prob a b ly  been in contact w ith ....'. This is an example of a strategy 
that some prosecution-commissioned scientists would use when being challenged in 
court: they would strengthen their opinion from that expressed in their original written 
report. Other scientists would adopt the opposite strategy and weaken their opinion in 
the face of challenge. Neither strategy is satisfactory for the effective, fair 
administration of justice.
11 Ward (n 6) 679.
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Whatever the motivation and skills that Dr Skuse employed as he formed the opinions 
that he offered in evidence, this case begs the question of whether, at this time, there 
was a more acceptable, more logical and robust guiding structure for forming forensic 
science opinions.
2.2.3 The case o f the 'Birmingham Six'12
The case of the 'Birmingham Six' also involved evidence provided by Dr Skuse and 
exposes similar issues to the Judith Ward case. The 'Birmingham Six', Mr 
Mcllkenny, Mr Hill, Mr Power, Mr Callaghan, Mr Walker and Mr Hunter, were 
convicted in 1975 of the murder of twenty-one people in bombs that exploded in two 
Birmingham city centre pubs in 1974. The prosecution case relied primarily upon two 
strands: the confessions of the defendants and the scientific evidence apparently 
implicating Mr Hill and Mr Power. A key part of the scientific evidence was 
provided by Dr Skuse. It consisted of positive reactions for nitroglycerine obtained 
from hand swabs taken from Mr Hill and Mr Power. Verbatim transcripts o f his 
evidence at the original trial are difficult to obtain and there is a distinct lack of 
authoritative references to this case in the publically available literature. Therefore, a 
secondary source (Mullin C. 1990) has been used for quotes from Dr Skuse's oral 
evidence. Mullin (1990) reports the following:
H e (D r Skuse) to ld  the court that, on the basis o f  the G riess tests alone, he was 
1quite h appy' that P ow er and H ill had been in contact with com m ercial 
explosives.
'What do you  mean by “quite h a p p y” he w as asked.
12 R  v  M c l l k e n n y  [1991] 93 Cr.App.R. 287.
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'Ninety-ninepercent certain' was his reply.
The judge at the original trial, Mr Justice Bridge, is reported as having described the 
forensic science evidence as one of two 'absolutely critical' chapters in the evidence 
against the six men. The jury, in turn, found the evidence compelling and convicted 
all six men. The men appealed unsuccessfully in 1976 against their convictions. 
Their second appeal against conviction in 1987 again failed, despite new evidence 
being adduced by the defence that suggested the scientific evidence was, at best, 
questionable or, at worst, unreliable and misleading. Finally, their third appeal in 
1991 was successful - the evidence of Dr Skuse was successfully challenged 
following similar arguments to those in the Judith Ward case.
Of particular note in this case were the comments made by the judge at the original 
trial on the way in which the jury could resolve differences of opinion between 
experts. As quoted by the Court of Appeal at the 1991 appeal:
M em bers o f  the ju ry , the resolution o f  scientific argum ent o f  this so rt is 
difficult, particu larly  difficult fo r  a ju ry  o f  lay people, and I  say once again  
that I  am not going  to try and go  into the technicalities in deta il because I  
w ould be in grave danger o f  m isleading you. The only w ay that you  can  
resolve these differences is by you r impression o f  the witnesses. Use any  
technical knowledge that you  have, but I  suspect that in the end you  w ill ju d g e  
it p rim arily  by you r im pression o f  the witnesses, and secondly perhaps by a 
com parison o f  their relative experience.13
13 Mcllkenny (n 12) 8.
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The advice to the jury to rely on ‘impressions’ of the experts is perhaps 
understandable, given the way in which the experts’ evidence was adduced and 
challenged in court, but it is a very poor substitute for a rational appraisal of the basis 
and robustness of the experts’ opinions. Quite clearly, the judge was in difficulty in 
advising the jury arguably because he had no unifying framework with which to test 
the opinions.
The case raises again the question of how the experts could have presented their 
findings in a more reliable, more robust, more accessible way to help the jury reach its 
decision.
2.2.4 The case of Stefan Kiszko14
The late Stefan Kiszko served 16 years in prison after he was convicted in 1976 of the 
sexual assault and murder in 1975 of Lesley Susan Molseed, an eleven-year old 
schoolgirl, whose body was found on Rishworth Moor in West Yorkshire. A forensic 
scientist, Mr Ron Outteridge, gave evidence about semen stains found on Lesley's 
clothing. These semen stains, as would be expected from the semen of a fertile man, 
contained spermatozoa. However, there was a suggestion that a ‘sample’, presumably 
of semen, obtained by the police from Mr Kiszko did not contain spermatozoa. 
Indeed, there was medical information that Mr Kiszko suffered from a condition 
known as hypogonadism that affected his ability to produce spermatozoa. Whether or 
not Mr Outteridge knew this at the time he gave evidence is a moot point and one that 
is difficult to ascertain without the original trial transcripts.
14 R  v  S t e f a n  K i s z k o ,  CA Transcript 2665/W 3/91, 18 February 1992
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Mr Kiszko's first appeal in 1978 against conviction failed; his second appeal was 
heard in 1992. After hearing new medical evidence, Lord Chief Justice Lane said:
It has been shown that this man cannot produ ce sperm. This man cannot have 
been the person  responsible fo r  ejaculating over the g irl's knickers and skirt, 
and consequently cannot have been the m u rd erer}5
Mr Kiszko was accordingly exonerated o f the crime.
A DNA profile was eventually obtained from semen from Lesley’s clothing and, when 
entered onto the national DNA database, revealed a match with Ronald Castree. Mr 
Castree was subsequently charged with Lesley's murder and was found guilty of the 
crime in 2007.
The issue in this case is one of profoundly poor interpretation of the value of the 
scientific findings. If Mr Outteridge had had a robust interpretational model that 
would accommodate the conditioning background information of Mr Kiszko's 
fertility, then perhaps he would not have presented evidence that was used to convince 
the jury that an innocent man had committed a serious crime. In the absence of the 
trial transcript, it is impossible to know for certain what Mr Outteridge said in court 
but, judging by common practice of the day, it is likely he simply presented his 
finding, that of the presence of semen on the clothing, and left interpretation of its 
value for the lawyers to argue and for the jury to decide.
15 Kiszko (n 14) 10.
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These four cases provide examples of poor technical knowledge and poor scientific 
method. What they also provide is examples of poor reasoning -  reasoning that leads 
to opinions that are not robust, not transparent and not balanced and, therefore, highly 
prejudicial against defendants who eventually were found to be innocent in the eyes of 
the law.
2.3 Interpretational model
2.3.1 Historical background
Until the 1980s, scientists had very little formal training in the skills of interpretation 
beyond that of 'learning by apprenticeship' -  trainee scientists would work alongside 
more experienced colleagues, watch what they did and listen to the opinions 
expressed. These expressions of opinion would comprise a wide range of words and 
phrases to convey the scientists’ views on the meaning or strength of their findings 
(see later, section 2.3.3). Furthermore, there was nothing in forensic science training 
in the UK genetically on inference or on dealing logically with uncertainty. Statistical 
training was limited and consisted mainly o f the application of significance tests in, 
for example, the comparison of measurements o f physical and chemical properties of 
glass fragments. Evett (1991) provides a very good summary of this situation in the 
70s and 80s, and Aitken (2009) describes the progression of the use of statistics in 
forensic science from 'relative frequencies' through 'discriminating power' and 
'significance probabilities' to 'likelihood ratios'. There had been early papers 
exploring the application of Bayes’ Theorem to forensic science problems, including 
one by Finkelstein and Fairley (1970) who were based in the United States of 
America. However, it was a paper by a UK-based statistician (Lindley 1977) that 
stimulated Evett, a forensic scientist and statistician working for the Forensic Science
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Service in England and Wales, to push forward with applying Bayesian thinking to 
the interpretation of comparison of measurements on questioned and reference 
samples of not only glass but o f all transfer evidence. To quote Evett (1991, page 12): 
What is the functional relationship between coincidence prob a b ility  and  
evidential strength? D ennis Lindley's response (1977) w as to show  how the 
Bayesian likelihood ratio  ... p rov ides a conceptually sim ple and  coherent one- 
stage solution to the problem .
and later (page 12):
Thus evidential value is m easured by a continuous function with no arbitrary  
cut-off.
For the first time, with this reference, there is the germ of guidance on how scientists 
should appraise logically the strength of their findings.
2.3.2 Inference and Bayes’ Theorem -  a brief overview
Triers of fact in Courts of Law are required to consider the evidence that is presented 
to them and to use that evidence in reaching a decision on an uncertain event -  the 
guilt or innocence of the defendant. One would hope that the triers of fact would 
reason carefully and apply, knowingly or not, the rules of logic to reach their 
inferences. Much has been written on inference and logic, but most authorities 
recognise three forms of inference: deduction, induction and abduction. Deduction is 
necessarily a deterministic process -  the inference flows naturally from universally 
true premises. It is sometimes described as arguing from the general to the specific. 
Examples of deductive inferences in forensic science would include the answers
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provided by classification systems and the exclusion of samples where questioned 
samples do not match the putative source. Inductive inference is not deterministic; it 
is ampliative, in the sense that the inference adds to our knowledge but does not 
provide a conclusive answer. The truth of the major premise of the argument will be 
advanced or pushed back as each new piece of information or evidence is considered. 
Inductive inference requires an understanding o f the numerical associations between 
observations and therefore relies on statistics about these observations. Inductive 
inference is also described as arguing from the specific to the general and is entirely 
relevant to the issues of importance within the judicial process. Finally, abduction is 
the generation of hypotheses to explain observations; it has a key role in investigative 
situations where there is uncertainty about the circumstances o f an incident. 
Anderson et al. (2005, page 55) provide a succinct summary of these three forms of 
inference.
Deduction, induction and abduction all have their part to play during the course of the 
investigative and judicial processes but, when considering at trial the evidential force 
or weight provided by the scientific observations (evidence), induction is the form of 
inference that is best suited to providing that assessment. Furthermore, many scholars 
of legal reasoning advocate a probabilistic approach to inductive logic. Feinberg 
(1997), commenting on the various forms of reasoning that have been proposed, 
asserts:
"... to rem edy the c la im ed inadequacies o f  the theory o f  probability, in recent 
years we have been exposed to such alternatives as Cohen's Baconian  
inference, D em pster-Shafer b e lie f functions, fu zzy  sets etc. In the end, when
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su bjected  to careful scrutiny, each o f  these a lternatives has been tried  and  
fo u n d  severely  wanting. ” 
and later:
“This does not mean that p ro b a b ility  theory, and with it Bayes ’ Theorem, is a 
pan acea  fo r  a ll situations. ”
The current author agrees fully with these comments and can add that he has not seen 
any method, other than evaluating a likelihood ratio within a Bayesian framework, for 
assessing the weight of scientific evidence in a coherent, robust, accessible way for 
the court.
i LThe Reverend Thomas Bayes, an 18 century cleric and mathematician, is generally 
attributed with first describing the Theorem - a mathematical formula that 
demonstrates how uncertainty about a possible event can be updated in a logical way 
when new information or evidence is presented (Bayes 1763). The probability of 
event (H) given the background information (I) is denoted by Pr(//|7) and represents 
the prior uncertainty, or p r io r  p ro b a b ility , of that event. The vertical bar ‘|’ in the 
notation is called the conditioning bar and can be read as ‘given’ or ‘assuming’. The 
probability in question is dependent on, is informed by, or conditioned on, the 
background information. The probability of event (H) given the new evidence (E) is 
denoted by ?r(H\E,I) and represents the updated uncertainty, or p osterio r  probability , 
of that event. Bayes’ Theorem demonstrates the p osterio r  p robab ility  is proportional 
to the product of the p r io r  p rob a b ility  and the probab ility  o f  the evidence given the 
truth of the event:
Pr[ H  | E J ]  oc Pr[E | H J ] x P r [ H  | / ] [Equation 1]
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The middle term in this expression, Pr[is|//,/], is known as a likelihood  and, although 
superficially similar to the p o sterio r  probability , it is crucially different -  it is a 
reversal of the terms of the posterior probability. Instead of the probability of the 
event in question, given knowledge of the new evidence, the likelihood  is the 
probability of obtaining the new evidence given that the uncertain event were actually 
true.
In situations where two mutually exclusive, exhaustive events are being considered, 
then the so-called Odds Form of Bayes’ Theorem can be applied. In this form, the 
p o sterio r  odds of the event are equal to the likelihood ratio  for the evidence 
multiplied by the p r io r  odds of the event. In judicial situations where there is a 
prosecution proposition and a defence alternative, then the Odds Form of Bayes’ 
Theorem can be represented as follows:
where H P and H D represent respectively the prosecution and defence positions.
The right-hand ratio of this equation represents the odds of the prosecution 
proposition being true, prior to the scientific evidence being heard or adduced. This 
expression is therefore known as the p r io r  odds. The left-hand ratio of the equation, 
following similar nomenclature, is known as the p o sterio r  odds of the prosecution 
proposition being true, after the scientific evidence has been presented. The p o sterio r  
odds are then the product of the p r io r  odds and the ratio in the centre of the equation -  
that ratio is called the likelihood ratio. In words, it can be expressed as: the 
probability of obtaining the evidence, given that the prosecution proposition were 
true, divided by the probability of obtaining the evidence, given that the defence
Pr(//f | E,  / )  Pr(£ | H p, / )  Pr(//f | / )
[Equation 2]
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proposition were true. The likelihood ratio  can be viewed as a measure o f the value of 
the evidence. In other words, it is a measure of the impact of the scientific evidence 
on the p r io r  odds. It is the likelihood ratio  that provides an elegant means of 
interpretation of evidence. An appraisal of the value of the likelihood ratio requires 
the scientist to draw upon all the expert knowledge that they possess and it provides 
the framework within which the scientist operates. It is truly the domain of the 
scientist.
It is important to note that the background information T  will consist of those, and 
only those, parts of the case circumstances that influence, or condition, the probability 
assignments. However, the parts of the background information that condition 
Vr(Hp\I) and ?r(Ho\I) will be different from those parts that condition Pr(E\Hp,I) and 
? t(E \H d ,T). This is a very important notion when considering so-called ‘context 
effects’ (Saks et al. 2003). These will be introduced and discussed later in Chapter 3 
of this thesis.
Despite publishing numerous seminal papers (Evett 1983, Evett 1984, Evett 1986, 
Evett 1987a, Evett 1987b, Evett 1989, Evett 1990, Evett 1991) covering both theory 
and practical examples, Evett's proposal of Bayesian inference, and, in particular, 
appraisal of a likelihood ratio, as a unifying conceptual framework for forming and 
utilising expert opinion was not embraced by the profession in the United Kingdom. 
As late as 1996, a paper by Rudram (1996) and ensuing correspondence (Taroni and 
Aitken 1996, Davis et al. 1996, Aitken and Taroni 1996) revealed that there was still 
misunderstanding and controversy over the so-called ’Bayesian approach’ among 
leading professional forensic scientists. There will have been various reasons for
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practitioners’ reluctance to adopt a likelihood ratio approach and, in the view of the 
current author, these will have included:
- aversion to changing methods that appeared to have worked well over the 
course of many years;
- difficulty in understanding Bayes’ Theorem;
- dislike of using likelihood ratio assessments instead of offering posterior 
probabilities for propositions or, more simply, offering explanations.
2.3.3 Expressions of expert opinion
It can be suggested that the way in which individuals express their opinions provides a 
window on their thought-processes. Words can reveal how scientific findings have 
been appraised and how inferences have been formed. Both Rudram's work (1996) 
and earlier studies by Craddock, Lamb and Moffat (1989) and Satterthwaite and 
Lambert (1989) found a wide range of phrases being used by scientists to express 
their opinions. For some of these phrases, there was a wide variation between 
scientists and their clients (police, lawyers etc) in the perception of the strength of the 
phrase. Furthermore, even the within the scientists’ group, there was wide a variation 
in scientists’ perception of the strength of some phrases. Although the authors did 
not attribute the 'within-scientist' variation to any particular factor, it could be argued 
that apprenticeship-style of teaching, as mentioned previously, would influence 
trainee scientists to emulate their individual mentors, who would have their own 
particular way of thinking and their own habitual, favourite way of writing opinions.
A further feature to note about experts’ statements of the time, based on the current 
author’s personal knowledge, was the brevity of such statements, with little
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explanation o f the rationale of the examinations or of how opinions had been 
formulated.
To summarise, during this critical period there was significant scope for improvement 
firstly in the way experts formed and expressed opinions, secondly, in the consistency 
of opinions between scientists and, finally, in the mutual understanding between 
providers and users o f expert reports and statements.
2.4 ’Value-for-money*
Government initiatives in the late 1980s encouraged public services to be more cost- 
effective and efficient in their operations and service-provision. In some areas, the 
means of achieving such aims was through the introduction of direct charging of 
customers for the service provided by the public body. Forensic science was one such 
area that, up to that date, had been centrally funded from local and national 
government, with very little connection between the supply o f services and the 
demand for those services. A key report by Touche Ross (1987) contained proposals 
for the re-organisation of the provision of forensic science along more business-like 
lines. This report kick-started the process of transformation of the provision of 
forensic science in the English and Welsh jurisdiction and, with the subsequent 
introduction of payment directly by customers for each case examination or each 
service, attention of both suppliers and customers turned to achieving ’value-for- 
money'. The basic notion underpinning the transformation to a 'business-like' 
organisation was that, by giving customers the freedom and the means to buy 
whatever forensic services they wanted, customers would focus on identifying and 
purchasing only the most cost-effective services on offer. This, in turn, would drive
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providers to improve the quality and quantity of the services offered. Gallop (2003), 
Fraser (2007), Tilley and Townsley (2009) and Cooper and Mason (2009) all provide 
succinct historical accounts of the position of forensic science in England and Wales 
at that time and the changes that ensued in the relationship between the police as 
'customers' and the forensic science organisations as 'providers'. Fraser and Williams 
(2009) give an overview and comparison of the political, social, economic and legal 
environment o f forensic science in the 1980s to the present date. Jackson and Jones 
(2009) provide an historical account of the background to the development of a model 
for Case Assessment and Interpretation (CAI). They describe how assessment of 
likelihood ratios for the potential outcomes of any proposed scientific examinations 
would provide the philosophical and practical basis to meet the requirement of 
providing ‘value-for-money’.
One of the key changes in the relationship between suppliers and customers in the 
early 1990s was the introduction of Scientific Support Managers in police forces in 
England and Wales. Part of this new role was to manage the police budget for 
forensic science. Perhaps inevitably, systems for monitoring the costs and the 
benefits of forensic science were introduced. While costs in the form of monthly 
spend were easy to measure, benefits were much harder to ascertain. Performance 
measures such as speed of delivery, number of items examined and number of 
'positive' cases were relatively straightforward to implement but, by themselves, did 
not get to the heart of measuring the effectiveness of forensic science. A major hurdle 
was the problem that the output o f forensic science could have an impact at any point 
along the investigative and criminal justice processes from incident through to court. 
It was hard, therefore, to tease out from other, non-forensic inputs exactly what
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contribution was made by forensic science. Fraser (2000) gives a flavour for the 
complexity faced by police forces when trying to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
services of forensic science providers. Tilley and Townsley (2009) provide a review 
of various studies and reports on the effectiveness of forensic science. They refer to 
earlier work by Tilley and Ford (1996) that evaluated the use by police forces of 
forensic science. One of the findings of this earlier work was that (page vi):
Current within-force routine methods o f  estim ating the effectiveness o f  
fo ren sic  rela ted  w ork have dubious reliability  or validity. They are, a t best, 
starting  poin ts fo r  fu rth er investigation.
McCullogh (1996) provides a comprehensive description of the data on ’forensic 
support' collected by a sample o f police forces and makes a number of 
recommendations for developing a more refined system, including a suggestion that 
“a central body should be tasked  with produ cing  ... more definitive definitions fo r  
evaluation scores ”. To date, the current author is unaware of such a development.
Forensic science providers responded in various ways to facilitate the new 
relationship with customers and to drive the internal changes necessary to make that 
relationship work. For example, the main provider of forensic science in England and 
Wales, the Forensic Science Service (FSS), introduced managerial roles that were 
‘customer-facing’ and implemented a system for monitoring costs and effectiveness. 
However, despite entering into joint projects with the customers, the FSS could only 
assess effectiveness from their limited standpoint as a supplier.
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It could be argued that the late 1980s and early 90s saw a conjunction of various 
pressures on forensic science. Firstly, improvements in technology, and increasing 
reliance on forensic science for investigations and criminal trials, meant there was 
ever-increasing demand on forensic science providers. Potentially huge resources 
would be required to examine all the items that could possibly be collected from 
scenes of crime and from suspects; however, there are only ever finite, limited 
resources available to carry out those examinations. Decisions had to be made on 
which items to examine and which tests to employ in any one particular case. 
Secondly, expert opinion was widely seen to be biased in nature and over-emphasised 
in value. It appeared that only a paradigm shift in the underlying philosophy of 
forensic science would resolve these pressures. The shift would not be simply 
esoteric; it needed to be a shift in forensic science thinking and practice that would 
impact on the whole investigative and criminal justice process.
In response to these pressures, ‘customer-facing’ managers in the Forensic Science 
Service (FSS), Phil Jones and Roger Cook, engaged with FSS forensic statisticians, 
Ian Evett and Jim Lambert and an FSS forensic science practitioner, the current 
author, Graham Jackson, to form an unique team, the CAI Team, to develop a 
rational, effective framework to guide practitioners. The project required the 
complementary skills and knowledge of the team members, but also relied heavily on 
the outputs of facilitated workshops, engaging with the majority of FSS’ practitioners, 
on case studies across all scientific disciplines in the FSS. The current author was the 
facilitator at these workshops and engaged with practitioners across all disciplines to 
test the initial framework, to gain new insights and to refine the framework. These 
refinements are described in Chapters 4 to 8 of this thesis.
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Chapter 3: A model for Case Assessment and Interpretation (CAI)
The changing environment of the Criminal Justice System in England and Wales in 
the 1990s stimulated the development of a new relationship between the providers of 
forensic science and the police, prosecution and defence authorities, who were now 
paying customers. The pressing requirement to provide value-for-money in forensic 
science, while still ensuring that the service was reliable and robust, offered 
potentially conflicting demands that needed to be accommodated. To that end, the 
FSS’ development team, described at the end of the preceding Chapter, set itself the 
task of developing a model that would:
“...enable decisions to be m ade which w ill deliver a value fo r  money 
service m eeting the needs o f  our d irect custom ers and the Crim inal 
Justice System. ”
The model that was subsequently developed and described by Cook et al. (1998a, 
provided in Appendix 1.1) was called the Case Assessment and Interpretation (CAI) 
model and addressed the issue of how to make informed, rational, effective decisions 
on which items to examine and which tests to use in individual cases. The authors 
based their proposal on the logical framework provided by Bayes’ Theorem, with a 
focus on assessment of the likelihood ratio to indicate potential evidential value and to 
help ensure any opinion formed from the findings was balanced, robust and justified. 
Lawless (2010) described the CAI model approach as ‘a notable a ttem pt to reform the 
role and position  o fforen sic  scien tists within the current crim inal ju s tice  system. ’
The model for CAI was depicted as a staged process composed of three phases of 
work:
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customer requirement
case pre-assessment 
service delivery
While the third stage - ‘service delivery’ - was broadly what all forensic scientists 
would normally do in some form or other, the novel and critically important feature of 
the model was the description o f two additional phases -  ‘customer requirement’ and 
‘case pre-assessment’ -  that should be carried out by the scientist before they 
embarked on delivering their usual service. Conventionally, forensic scientists would 
be presented with a set of items to examine along with some form of request or 
instruction from the police. At one end of the spectrum, this request could be phrased 
in a broad form, such as ‘... p ro v id e  foren sic  evidence against the su spect'. With this 
form of request, there is scope for the scientist to decide which items (exhibits or 
productions) to examine and which tests to use. At the other end of the spectrum, the 
instruction could be in the form of a specific direction. For example, the request 
could be along the lines of ‘... examine the clothing from  the accused fo r  g lass  
fragm ents and com pare with the control sam ple from  the broken w indow .’ Even with 
this example, while there may be limited scope for decisions to be made on which 
items to examine, there may still be decisions to take on which tests to employ when 
comparing any glass fragments that may be recovered. The crucial question in both 
situations is one of how were these decisions to be made and, when they were made, 
were they good decisions?
Research by Ramsay (1987) and by Tilley and Ford (1996) showed that police 
officers, generally, were ill-informed about the use and benefits of forensic science. 
A proportion of police requests for forensic science examinations were based on poor
34
understanding o f the potential benefits and limitations of the service being requested. 
On the other hand, scientists had very limited understanding of the circumstances of 
the case being submitted and, through tradition or through a perceived pressure to 
complete the examination, tended not to try to elicit any more information from the 
police. Furthermore, scientists employed only those tests and techniques that were 
available in their own laboratory. The deployment of tests and techniques was based 
on a degree of logic about, for example, the specificity and sensitivity o f the tests, but 
was also based on tradition and heuristics.
The first phase in the process of the CAI model, the so-called ‘customer requirement’ 
phase, encourages the scientist, in each case, to engage pro-actively with the police 
(or, more widely, the customer) and, through dialogue, gain an understanding o f the 
detailed needs o f the case. The scientist should aim to understand the issues that were 
in dispute, or the issues for which there was uncertainty. It would be only through 
this process that the scientist could then start to develop an examination strategy of 
which items to examine and which tests to use to help address the issues.
In the second phase of the model, the phase of ‘case pre-assessment’, attention is 
focussed on assessing the most likely outcomes of the various examination options, 
along with the potential evidential strength of each outcome. The means o f achieving 
this assessment is through, firstly, definition of appropriate pairs of propositions that 
reflect the prosecution and defence positions. Secondly, following Bayes’ Theorem, 
the scientist should consider and assign probabilities or, more precisely, likelihoods 
for the potential outcomes of the examinations, given the truth of both the prosecution 
proposition and the defence alternative, and given the conditioning background
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information T .  The only factors within the background information that should 
influence the scientists’ assignments would be those aspects of the circumstances that 
have a bearing on the likelihoods of obtaining the different outcomes. These factors 
would include, for example, what witnesses say about the activity carried out by the 
offender and what the defendant offers as an alternative. Saks et al. (2003) suggest 
there is ‘domain specific’ and ‘domain irrelevant’ information and give examples of 
differing situations in which ‘domain irrelevant’ information affects adversely the 
interpretation of the scientist. The authors call this adverse influence the ‘context 
effect’. In the CAI model, when assigning likelihoods at the pre-assessment stage, the 
scientist is ‘blind’ to the eventual outcomes of their examinations and is therefore 
uninfluenced by those outcomes. In addition, by focussing on those, and only those, 
parts of the background information that condition likelihoods, it seems that only 
‘domain specific’, not ‘domain irrelevant’, information is being considered. Indeed, 
Saks et al. (2003) mention (page 88) the pre-assessment phase of CAI as a suitable 
means of reducing the risk of ‘context effect’.
As described in Section 2.3.2 of this thesis, the ratio of the two likelihoods is known 
as the likelihood ratio (LR), the broad magnitude of which provides an assessment of 
the weight of evidence for each specific outcome of the examination. Not only that, 
the pre-assessment also provides the probability of achieving these outcomes if  the 
suspect is truly guilty or truly innocent, thereby providing the customer with an 
assessment of likely usefulness of the examination.
On completion of this second phase of the model, an analysis of the customer- 
requirement and of a proposed examination strategy could be presented to, and
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Establishing the customer-requirement and devising effective examination strategies 
require very good communication and engagement between supplier and customer. 
If done well, this process would provide the best chance of delivering an effective and 
economic service and, thereby, help to reduce the amount of wasteful, unproductive 
work that may have been commissioned. Effective application of the first two phases 
of the model would help save costs to both customer and provider, and ensure that 
forensic science addressed the agreed key issues in each case, not just those issues that 
appeared to the scientist to be important or to the customer as the most obvious in the 
circumstances. The logical basis of Bayes’ Theorem provides the essential 
framework to guide practice.
It was recognised by the authors that the most effective forensic scientists had 
routinely practised, arguably unknowingly, the first two phases of the CAI model but 
that process had never been explicitly formulated or stated prior to this paper. For the 
first time, ‘best practice’ had been analysed, described and made transparent. As a 
result, forensic scientists, police and lawyers now had a published model that could be 
challenged, tested and improved. Furthermore, for the first time in forensic science, 
the two potentially conflicting pressures -  the requirement from the criminal justice 
system for robust, reliable, impartial, expert opinion and the drive from paying 
customers for effective, efficient, economic services from forensic science providers -  
had been accommodated. The contribution of this paper to the practice of forensic 
science was recognised by an award for 'Referenced Best Article' from the European
discussed with, the customer who, as the commissioner of the work, has the final say
on whether or not to proceed with the examination.
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Academy of Forensic Sciences in 2000 (ENFSI 2000) and, more recently, the model 
formed the basis of standards for forming evaluative opinion written by a consortium 
of all the main forensic science providers in the United Kingdom and the Republic of 
Ireland (AFSP 2009).
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Chapter 4: Refinement of the CAI model
4.1 Introduction
The CAI model is founded on the logical framework of Bayes’ Theorem and, as such, 
there can be little argument against the central tenet of the model. However, when the 
CAI model was first described, there had been limited application of Bayesian 
thinking, and therefore of the model, to real-life forensic science cases. The authors 
were well aware that wider exposure and application o f the model across the broad 
range of forensic science disciplines would reveal the benefits and limitations of the 
model. Over the course of the next four years or so following the initial publication, 
the authors embarked on a series of workshops with their practitioner colleagues and, 
to a more limited extent, with a small selection of police, lawyers and judges, to 
explain the model, to apply the model to a wide variety of case types and to gain 
feedback to help develop the model. As a result of this work, a number of papers 
were published that described the developments and the new insights that were 
gained. This chapter focuses on a set of three of those papers (see Appendix 2) that 
deal with developments that were of a more generic nature.
4.2 The hierarchy of propositions
The paper by Cook et al. (1998b), provided in Appendix 2.1, introduced the novel 
notion of a 'hierarchy of propositions' that helped to formalise and clarify the precise 
contribution of the forensic science evidence in any one particular case.
Perhaps the single most important element of the CAI model is the definition of a pair 
of propositions from which likelihood ratios for scientific findings can be derived. In 
any one particular case, propositions could be phrased by scientists in a variety of
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ways, all of which seemed relevant to the case. Analysis of these different forms of 
proposition revealed there was a hierarchical structure that connected the propositions 
in a logical way and that seemed to be generic in application. At the ‘lowest’ level in 
the structure, the scientist would consider propositions about the source of the 
‘questioned’ material that they had recovered. Examples would include propositions 
such as
the fib res  recovered from  the surface o f  the car sea t cam e from  the su sp ec t’s 
p u llo ver ,i
the b lood  on the shoe o f  the defendant cam e from  the victim  o f  the kicking 
assau lt;
the fo o tw ea r  mark a t the scene o f  the crim e cam e from  the shoe o f  the accused. 
The value of the findings in these situations would be related usually to an assessment 
of the ‘within-sample’ and ‘between-sample’ variability to inform probabilities for, 
respectively, the numerator and denominator of a likelihood ratio. This level of the 
hierarchy was designated level I and is called source-level.
At the next level in the hierarchy, designated level II, the scientist would be 
considering propositions relating to an activity that the accused is suspected of doing. 
Examples would include:
the su spect drove the stolen  car a t the time o f  the robbery ; 
the defendant w as the person  who kicked the victim ; 
the accused trod  on the bathroom  floor.
Assessment at this so-called activity-level automatically takes into account 
considerations at source-level and incorporates additional factors such as the amount 
and distribution of the apparent transferred material. The scientist should be best-
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placed to offer expert knowledge of transfer and distribution and, therefore, best- 
placed to offer assistance to the triers of fact in relation to issues of whether or not the 
accused actually did the activity.
The final level in the hierarchy, level III, involves consideration o f propositions 
relating to the crime that had been committed and was duly termed offence-level. 
Examples of this level would include:
the suspect com m itted the robbery; 
the defendant assaulted  the victim; 
the suspect w as the burglar
Analysis at offence-level would necessarily include consideration of relevant activity- 
level propositions. However, the analysis requires additional consideration of issues 
such as intent or, as in the case of some sexual offences, consent. The scientist is 
generally prevented from addressing offence-level propositions because issues of 
intent and consent are entirely in the province of the triers of fact and are completely 
outside the knowledge, expertise and role of the scientist.
By focussing on activity-level propositions, the scientist is encouraged to provide 
more effective opinion than simply staying at source-level. Activity-level is closer to 
the ultimate issue of guilt/not guilt and is a domain in which the scientist can bring to 
bear all their knowledge and expertise about transfer, persistence, distribution, 
detection and background levels of the evidential material in order to help the court 
arrive at a decision.
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It should be noted that, with the three examples of activity-level propositions given 
earlier, there has to be an assessment of the probability that the suspect/accused was 
wearing the items at the time of the crime. In some situations, it may be that the 
scientist is able to make an explicit assumption that the suspect was wearing the item 
at the relevant time and, of course, this would be open to challenge. In other 
situations, there may be more uncertainty about the issue of wearing and this may be 
best left for the court to appraise. If that were the case, then the scientist could 
consider modified propositions such as:
this is the clothing worn by the person  who drove the stolen car a t the tim e o f  
the robbery ;
this is the clothing worn by the person  who kicked the victim ; 
this is the shoe that w as worn by the person  who trod on the bathroom flo o r.
Finally, consideration of activity-level propositions enables the proper appraisal o f the 
value of the absence of evidence. If no transferred material has been found, and the 
scientist operates simply at source-level, then all that the scientist can say essentially 
is that they have found nothing. If the scientist operates at activity-level, then the 
absence of transferred material could well provide support for the defence alternative 
-  something that cannot be achieved if  the scientist stays at source-level.
The current author’s key contribution to this paper was the recognition and naming of 
the various levels of the hierarchy referred to as the ‘hierarchy of propositions’. For 
the first time, practitioners had a framework within which to set their work and 
thereby to help define the purpose of their work.
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As an indication of the impact of this paper, it has been cited in a major report by the 
National Academy of Sciences on the provision of forensic science in the United 
States (National Academy o f Sciences 2009, p i 17-118). The following is reproduced 
from the report, with the original footnote included:
“Analyses in the foren sic  science d isciplines are conducted to p rov ide  
information fo r  a variety  o fpu rposes in the crim inal ju stice  process. H owever, 
m ost o f  these analyses aim to address two broad types o f  questions: (1) can a 
particu lar p iece  o f  evidence be associa ted  with a particu lar class o f  sources?  
and (2) can a particu lar p iece  o f  evidence be associa ted  with one particu lar  
so u rce? ” 
and la te r...
“Although the questions addressed  by foren sic  analyses are not alw ays binary
(y e s /n o )..... . the parad igm  o f  yes/n o  conclusions is useful fo r  describing and
quantifying the accuracy with which foren sic  science disciplines can provide  
answ ers.5 ”
“ 5More complete discussion o f  the questions addressed by forensic science may be found in 
references such as K. Inman and N. Rudin. 2002. The origin o f  evidence. Forensic Science 
International 126:11-16; and R. Cook, I.W. Evett, G. Jackson, P.J. Jones, and J.A. Lambert. 
1998. A hierarchy o f  propositions: Deciding which level to address in casework. Science and 
Justice 38:231-239. ”
It is significant that this paper is one of the few European papers quoted in the NAS 
report, illustrating that the ideas developed in the paper have been acknowledged in 
the United States, a country that, to date, has been reluctant to adopt any form of 
Bayesian thinking in forensic science.
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4.3 The difference between propositions and explanations
The important philosophical distinction between ’propositions' and 'explanations' was 
explored and developed in the paper by Evett, Jackson and Lambert (2000), provided 
in Appendix 2.2. This paper laid the groundwork for an evolving idea that there were 
potentially two different roles for forensic science depending on whether the scientist 
was considering pairs of propositions, before they performed any substantive 
examination, or was offering alternative explanations after they had obtained results 
o f their examinations. The current author’s key contribution to this paper was the 
recognition that, when scientists offered opinions, there was a subtle but important 
distinction into two classes of opinion.
When trying to define propositions, it can be relatively easy for the scientist to set out 
the so-called prosecution proposition along the lines of the allegations or suspicions of 
the police and/or prosecutors. Defining the alternative to the prosecution’s 
proposition can also be relatively straightforward if the defendant has given an 
alternative story in interview or, later, in evidence. However, in those cases where the 
defendant has not given any intimation of their story, or has not stated their version of 
events, then the scientist is in a quandary. In these situations, there was a tendency for 
scientists to generate alternative explanations for their findings, after they knew what 
those findings were. This is an open-ended process with potentially a large number of 
alternative explanations, some of which could be reasonable while others would be 
fanciful or even completely unrealistic. If the scientist does generate an alternative 
explanation, and if  this alternative were indeed true, it would follow that the 
likelihood of the findings would approach a probability value of 1. It may well be 
that the likelihood of the findings if the prosecution proposition were true would also
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approach a value of 1. In that situation, the likelihood ratio for the scientific evidence 
would be 1 and the evidence would therefore be o f no probative value. This result did 
not fit well with a general view that positive findings did indeed have some probative 
value. The key to resolving this difficulty was the requirement that the scientist 
should assess, before carrying out any substantive work, the potential value of the 
findings based on the prosecution propositions and defence alternatives as they were 
known at that time. This approach would avoid the charge o f p o s t hoc rationalisation 
-  the construction of an alternative that fits the findings -  and is another example of 
reducing the risk of ‘context effects’ (Saks et al. 2003).
There is a role, however, for the construction of such explanations and this occurs in 
investigative situations when, for example, there is no suspect or where there is 
uncertainty about what happened at a scene of a crime, irrespective of who committed 
that crime. Saks et al. (2003) give a good example (page 85) of the distinction 
between ‘investigation’ and what they describe as ‘forensic science’ or, what could be 
described more appropriately as ‘evaluation’ of weight of evidence.
4.4 ‘Two-way’ transfer
The cases used as examples in the papers cited so far involved essentially ‘one-way 
transfer’ of evidential material. Interpretation of the findings at activity-level in this 
type of case essentially requires the scientist to consider two questions of the form:
how likely is it that this amount o f  material, in this location and giving this 
(chemical) analysis w ou ld  have been obtained i f  the prosecution  w ere true? 
how likely is it that this amount o f  material, in this location and g iving  this 
(chemical) analysis w ou ld  have been obtained i f  the alternative were true?
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However, many cases involve more than one type of evidential material and the 
implications of applying the CAI model in so-called 'two-way' transfer cases were 
explored in a paper by Cook et al. (1999), provided in Appendix 2.3. The authors 
used an example in which there was potential transfer of fibres from the clothing of a 
suspect to that of the victim as well as from the victim to the suspect -  so-called ‘two- 
way’ transfer.
The key consideration in evaluating the weight of the evidence in such cases is that of 
assigning conditional probabilities for the second transfer, or second type of evidence. 
While the scientist will still consider the pair of questions as outlined above, they now 
have to consider the following additional questions:
how likely is it that this amount o f  material, in this location and g iving  this 
(chem ical) analysis w ould  have been obtained i f  the prosecution  w ere true 
AND GIVEN the findings in relation to the f ir s t  transfer? 
how likely is it that this amount o f  material, in this location and g iving  this 
(chemical) analysis w ould have been obtained i f  the alternative w ere true 
AND GIVEN the findings in relation to the fir s t  transfer?
These additional questions expose conditional probabilities for the second set of 
findings and may, if  assigned robustly, demonstrate limited or no additional value in 
performing the second examination. The potential benefit of saving time and 
resources would only be achieved if  this type of assessment were to be done before 
carrying out the work rather than after the work had been completed.
This paper provided the rationale for making informed decisions on whether it was of 
value to examine further items or employ further tests within a case. It also offered a
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more robust, logical approach to evaluating the combined weight o f different pieces of
evidence.
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Chapter 5: The impact of Case Assessment and Interpretation on 
statements and reports of scientific evidence
The paper by Evett et al. (2000a), provided in Appendix 3.1, suggested a structure for 
writing statements of evidence. It was argued that the logical process, both o f thought 
and of deed, captured by the CAI model should be reflected in the structure and 
content of statements written for the purposes of criminal proceedings. The CAI 
model was based on phases that flowed logically from each other and which led 
naturally to a conclusion. It was proposed that headed sections in statements and 
reports would capture these phases and demonstrate both the rationale for the 
examination and the way in which the findings had been interpreted. If done well, 
readers of the statement should be led to arrive at the same conclusion as the scientist 
even before they read that conclusion. The structure suggested by the CAI model 
provided transparency about what the scientist had done, why they did it and how 
they had arrived at their opinion.
This particular paper (Evett et a l , 2000a) was mentioned in the National Academy of 
Sciences report on forensic science in the United States (National Academy of 
Sciences 2006, p i85-186) in a chapter entitled ‘Improving Methods, Practice, and 
Performance in Forensic Science’. Within this chapter, there is a section called 
‘Reporting Results’ in which three papers are recommended as guidance on 
terminology and on interpretation o f evidence. Relevant parts of the report are 
reproduced here, with the reference from the footnote shown in brackets:
“There is a critical need in m ost fie ld s  o f  fo ren sic  science to ra ise the
standards fo r  reporting and testifying about the results o f  investigations. ”
48
and la te r...
“Although som e disciplines have developed  vocabulary and sca les to be used  
in reporting results, they have not becom e stan dard  practice. This im precision  
in vocabulary stem s in p a r t  from  the p au city  o f  research in foren sic  science  
and the corresponding lim itations in interpreting the results o f  foren sic  
analyses. Publications such as Evett e t a l.5, Aitken and Taroni6, and E vett7 
p ro v id e  the essential building blocks fo r  the p ro p er assessm ent and  
communication o fforen sic  findings. ”
(5I. W. Evett, G. Jackson, J.A. Lambert, and S. McCrossan. 2000. The impact o f the principles 
o f evidence interpretation on the structure and content o f statements. Science and Justice 
40(4):233-239.)
All the major providers of forensic science services in the United Kingdom follow the 
basic structure proposed in the paper. The current author is also aware that providers 
in the Republic of Ireland, Holland and Sweden are considering, or are trying out, a 
similar structure.
A further, novel development described in this paper was the introduction of a fourth 
level in the hierarchy of propositions. The current author was conscious that there 
was a problem with the evaluation of evidence in those cases in which DNA-profiles 
could not be attributed to specific body fluids or tissues. He introduced the novel 
notion of sub-level I, or sub-source , propositions to accommodate this problem. 
Further details of this development are provided in the next Chapter that deals 
specifically with DNA evidence.
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Chapter 6: Application of the principles of Case Assessment and 
Interpretation to specific evidence types
6.1 Cases involving DNA-analysis
The technique known as Multi-Locus Profiling (MLP) (Jeffreys et al. 1985) was the 
first DNA-profiling technique to be used for evidential purposes in criminal 
proceedings in the UK and was introduced to courts of law in the late 1980s. The 
output of the MLP technique was the familiar ‘bar-code’ pattern. Interpretation of the 
results was based on an estimate of the probability of sharing, by chance, the 
particular number of matching ‘bars’ that had been observed. Subsequent generations 
of DNA-profiling techniques involved analysis of specific loci, or sites, within the 
DNA molecule, and the results were in the form of electrophoretograms that showed 
which alleles (DNA types) were present at each of the loci. Interpretation of these 
results relies on databases o f DNA-profiles from samples of people o f the three main 
ethnic groups. From these databases, relative frequencies of occurrence for specific 
combinations of alleles can be calculated. These relative frequencies are then used to 
assign a probability (likelihood) for obtaining the match if the DNA had originated 
from someone other than, and unrelated to, the suspect with whom a match had been 
obtained. Evaluation of the weight of the evidence, in the form of a likelihood ratio, 
for the matching profiles can consist, in its simplest form, of the reciprocal of the 
match probability. The ensuing likelihood ratios for full profiles obtained using the 
SGM Plus® technique are then of the order 1 billion (Evett e t a l  2000b). In Bayesian 
terms, this means that the posterior odds of the DNA having come from the suspect 
would be equal to the prior odds of this event multiplied by 1 billion. Numbers such 
as 1 billion suggest huge evidential power and therein lies the beguiling attraction of
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DNA-profiling evidence. However, in some situations, this power can be deceptive, 
and the attraction misleading, because of the influence of two key considerations -  
relevance and attribution.
At one end of the spectrum of cases, the body fluid that has been found and tested is 
accepted as directly relevant to the offence, and the DNA-profile that has been 
obtained can be attributed with certainty to that body fluid. In these cases, if  the 
suspect denies any involvement whatsoever with the offence, then the power of the 
matching DNA-profiles can be translated directly to consideration of whether or not 
the suspect committed the offence -  the value of 1 billion for the likelihood ratio 
provided by the DNA evidence would be appropriate also for the likelihood ratio at 
activity level and possibly also at offence level. An illustration o f such a situation is 
provided by the following hypothetical case.
A victim  o f  an assault alleges he w as kicked severa l tim es to the head by one 
person. A s a result o f  his injuries, the victim  bled heavily. A suspect was 
arrested  a short tim e after the incident and denies any involvem ent w hatsoever  
with the attack. In particular, he denies being anywhere near the location o f  
the offence and he has no explanation as to why he m ay have any b lood on his 
clothing. On examination o f  his clothing and footw ear, a single bloodstain  is 
fou n d  on his right shoe. A D N A -profile obtained from  this stain  is a single, 
fu ll  p rofile  and matches that o f  the victim. N on-bloodstained areas from  
around this single bloodstain are a lso tested  but g ive  no profiles whatsoever. 
It is therefore a safe assumption that the profile  that has been obtained can be 
attribu ted  to the bloodstain and not to any underlying DNA from  other body  
flu ids o r  tissues.
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Evaluation of the weight of the scientific findings at activity level for this case would 
consider the probability of the findings under the following competing propositions: 
the suspect is the person who kicked the victim 
the suspect has nothing at all to do with the assault 
The evaluation has, broadly, two components: 1) the probability of obtaining 
bloodstaining of this appearance on the shoe, and 2) the probability of obtaining 
matching DNA-profiles. If likelihood ratios were to be assessed for each of these two 
components, the value provided by the presence/appearance of the bloodstaining 
would be small compared to that provided by the matching profiles: the first 
likelihood ratio would be typically of an order between 10 and 100, while the second 
would be typically of the order 1 billion. Whatever the actual weight at activity-level 
that is provided by the first likelihood ratio, it would be ‘swamped’ by the weight of 
the second likelihood ratio. Evaluation o f the weight of the scientific evidence at 
activity-level in this case is driven by the match probability for the DNA profile.
At the other end of the spectrum, although matching DNA-profiles may be obtained, 
they provide very poor likelihood ratios at activity-level. Another case, based loosely 
on the circumstances of an actual murder, will be used to illustrate this type of 
situation.
A witness sees a man, who w as loading bags into the boot o f  a car, being  
approached by a secon d man. The witness describes this second man as 
w earing a h ooded top which preven ts the witness from  seein g  his face. When 
the hooded man is about 2 m etres aw ay from  the man by the boot, he pu lls  a 
handgun from  his pocket, takes aim and fire s  a single shot a t the head o f  the 
man by the boot. The hooded man runs aw ay and the man by the car fa lls  to
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the ground. The w itness runs over to attend to the man on the ground but 
cannot resuscitate him. The man dies as a result o f  the gunshot.
On examination o f  the scene, the only item o f  significance that is fo u n d  is a 
spent bullet case, believed  to have been ejected  autom atically from  the gun. 
D N A -profiling tests on this bullet case g ive  a weak, single DNA-proflle. Tests 
to indicate the body flu id  or tissue from  which the profile  has been obtained  
p ro ve  inconclusive. A fter severa l weeks, the p o lice  arrest a suspect and  
subsequently f in d  that his D N A-profile corresponds with the profile  from  the 
bullet case. H e does not have a gun in his possession  and the gun that was 
actually used is never recovered.
In this situation, the weight of the DNA evidence at activity level will not necessarily 
be driven by the match probability (typically 1 in 1 billion) because, crucially, the 
relevance of the DNA-profile to the actual activity of firing the gun at the time of the 
offence is uncertain. Nor is it possible to attribute the profile to a specified body 
fluid/tissue. The only way to make progress in this situation is to try to make an 
assessment of the probability of the DNA-profile actually coming from the firer o f the 
gun, whoever that was. The scientist could help with providing data, if it is available, 
on the occurrence of firers’ profiles on spent bullet cases but there would also be an 
element of the trier of fact having a view on that probability, given the case 
circumstances. If that probability were to be assessed, by whomever, as 1, then the 
match probability would dominate the weight of the evidence. More likely, that 
probability would be assigned a value less than 1 and the resulting overall weight of 
the DNA evidence would be weaker than that provided solely by the match 
probability. The evaluation of the weight of the evidence becomes even more 
problematic if the suspect, while denying the shooting, admits to handling, in some
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unspecified way, ammunition in the recent past. This information conditions the 
alternative proposition of the likelihood ratio and has a crucial bearing on the 
scientist’s assessment of the probability of obtaining the matching DNA-profile given 
this alternative were true. It may be that the likelihood ratio at activity level, in this 
situation, would not be large and therefore of low probative value regardless of the 
very small match probability.
The paper by Evett et al. (2002), Appendix 4.1, demonstrated that, in these situations 
of uncertainty over attribution and relevance of DNA evidence, the power of matching 
DNA-profiles may well be greatly moderated. The authors applied the notion of the 
hierarchy of propositions to such cases and utilised the novel idea of sub-source  level 
propositions as described by Evett et al. (2000a). This new concept clarified the 
interpretation of DNA evidence and demonstrated crucially that misleading opinion 
could be presented to the courts if the scientist operated solely at sub-source level 
instead of the more useful, more effective, activity level. The paper provided the 
logical structure to help practitioners deliver safer opinions.
6.2 Illicit drugs
The paper by Booth et al. (2002), Appendix 4.2, proposed an application of the CAI 
model to cases of alleged supplying of illicit drugs. Most drugs cases involve 
relatively straightforward identification and quantification of drugs, requiring little in 
the way of interpretation. However, a small number of cases involve more complex 
issues of dealing in illicit drugs. For example, there are cases in which the issue is 
whether or not a suspected ‘dealer’ has supplied a quantity of drugs to a particular 
‘user’ from whom the drugs have been seized.
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Booth et al. (2002) emphasised the importance of precision in the words used by the 
scientist in such cases and, for the first time, highlighted the importance of specifying 
the stage of the drugs ‘supply chain’ that the scientist’s examination was addressing.
If ‘matches’ between the suspected ‘dealer’s’ sample and the ‘user’s’ sample were 
found, then the traditional approach was to report the along the lines of:
... p ow d ers are likely to have com e from  the sam e batch ...
... the packaging  is s im ila r ...
The authors posed the question (page 123) of whether this phraseology provided 
maximum value, clarity and balance to the Criminal Justice System and, if  not, what 
would constitute a better way?
The paper demonstrated how CAI principles could be applied to these cases and 
suggested that the specification of propositions and alternatives that were directly 
relevant to the issues in the case was central in encouraging robust, logical assessment 
and interpretation. This approach facilitated, for the first time, the proper, joint 
evaluation of the different types of scientific evidence that may be involved. Prior to 
this paper, the ‘match’ in appearance and chemical composition between the 
‘dealer’s’ and ‘user’s’ drugs would be reported separately from the ‘match’ in 
appearance and composition between the wrapping/packaging of those drugs. The 
paper showed that, by considering appropriate propositions and alternatives at activity 
level, the joint weight of these ‘matches’ could be appraised. Furthermore, in 
adopting this approach, the scientist would gain insights into which datasets were 
appropriate to inform probabilities for the scientific findings.
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The authors believed that application of the CAI model to this type of case provided 
four benefits -  consistency, robustness, balance and added-value - over the 
‘traditional’ approach.
The current author was the lead member of the team responsible for the approach 
described in this paper and provided the intellectual and philosophical framework to 
facilitate and develop, with his co-author specialist colleagues, application of the CAI 
model to drugs cases.
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Chapter 7: Case Assessment and Interpretation and the construction 
of relevant databases
The United States’ National Academy of Sciences (NAS), in a report on the state of 
forensic science (2009), concluded that (pi 84-185):
“There is a critical need in m ost fie ld s  o f  forensic  science to raise the 
standards fo r  reporting and testifying about the results o f  investigations. For 
example, many term s are used by foren sic  examiners in reports and in court 
testim ony to describe findings, conclusions, and the degrees o f  association  
between evidentiary m aterial (e.g., hairs, fingerprints, fib ers) and p articu lar  
p eop le  or objects. Such terms include but are not lim ited  to “match, ” 
“consistent with, ’’ “identical, ” “sim ilar in a ll respects tested, ” and “cannot 
be excluded as the source o f  ” The use o f  such terms can have a profound  
effect on how the trier o f  fa c t in a crim inal or civil m atter p erceives and  
evaluates evidence. Yet the foren sic  science disciplines have not reached  
agreem ent or consensus on the p rec ise  meaning o f  any o f  these terms. 
Although som e disciplines have developed  vocabulary and sca les to be used in 
reporting results, they have not becom e stan dard  practice. This im precision in 
vocabulary stem s in p a r t  from  the pau city  o f  research in foren sic  science and  
the corresponding lim itations in interpreting the results o f  forensic analyses. ”
This comment by the NAS on the ‘lim itations in interpreting the re su lts ’ begs the 
question of how should scientists interpret their findings. In the current author’s 
experience, scientists have interpreted their findings in a combination of ways ranging 
from a purely personal, intuitive approach that relies on experience, through to a 
demonstrably rational approach using published and verified data. The actual
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approach taken will depend on the scientist’s training, personal preference, corporate 
guidelines and the availability of reliable data. This variability in approach to 
interpretation is reflected in the variability o f terminology in reports and statements to 
which the NAS report refers. If phraseology such as "...could have com e from ...',
'...cannot exclude...' or, more simply, '...m atch...' are to be used, then the scientist 
requires knowledge primarily, and solely, about the variability of the material in 
question. Assessment of the weight of the evidence, if  addressed at all, would revolve 
around an estimate of a frequency o f occurrence. A key question would then be -  
what type o f data should be collected to provide appropriate, useful frequencies of 
occurrence? On the other hand, if phraseology such as '...likely to have broken the 
w indow...' or ' ...there is a high p robab ility  that the w earer o f  the clothing sa t in the 
driver's sea t o f  the car...', then something more than simply knowledge of 
frequencies of occurrence is required. The scientist requires knowledge and 
understanding of the transfer and persistence of the material in question.
The profession of forensic science has been conscious, since early days, of the need to 
collect relevant data and efforts have been made over the years to do so. Broadly 
speaking, two types of data have been compiled:
- data to inform estimates of frequencies of occurrence of evidential materials;
- data to inform investigative aspects, e.g. the distribution of material after a
particular activity; the maximum persistence of material after transfer.
In respect of the former data, the type of samples collected would generally be those 
that could be obtained conveniently. For example, glass objects that had been broken 
in the scientists’ homes or environment would be collected to form a dataset on the 
frequencies of occurrence of different glass types in the general environment; fibre
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samples would be collected from clothing items that were being examined within the 
laboratory to give an indication of commonness of different fibre types; footwear 
impressions were taken from footwear examined in the laboratory to give a frequency 
of footwear types. However, there were always discussions and challenges as to 
whether these were the most appropriate samples to collect. For example, do broken 
glass objects in households provide a good estimate of the frequency of occurrence of 
the types of broken glass on suspects’ clothing?
In respect to the second type of data mentioned (those relating to distribution and 
maximum persistence), there is a question as to whether they are the most appropriate 
data to assist in the interpretation of evidential weight.
While ground-breaking work on the use of data to assess evidential weight had been 
published for some evidential materials, e.g. glass (Curran, Hicks and Buckleton 
2000), the paper by Champod, Evett and Jackson (2004; Appendix 5.1) provided, for 
the first time, generic guidance on the collection of relevant data. The authors 
concentrated on source-level issues and developed a general treatment to inform the 
probabilities of a likelihood ratio. The key to the approach was the teasing out of two 
aspects of scientific evidence -  observations that relate to the reference sample (of 
known origin) and observations that relate to the recovered sample (whose origin is 
unknown). The work showed that, provided certain assumptions were made, then, in 
principle, the scientist required data to inform three different types of relative 
frequency. An example involving footwear marks serves to illustrate the principle. It 
should be noted that the notation used in this example has been simplified from that 
used in the paper.
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Assume a footwear mark has been found at the scene of a crime and that a suspect has 
been arrested on suspicion o f committing the offence. His shoes and the scene mark 
are submitted for examination and, subsequently, a ‘match’ is found between the mark 
at the scene and the suspect’s shoe.
The likelihood ratio [from Equation 2] provided by this match is given by:
Pv(E\ffpj)
Pr(£ | / /„ , / ) [Equation 3]
where ‘E’ denotes the ‘match’, ‘Hp’ represents the prosecution proposition ‘the 
suspect’s shoe made the mark at the scene’, and HD’ represents the defence 
proposition ‘the suspect’s shoe did not make the mark at the scene’.
Champod, Evett and Jackson (2004) decomposed ‘E’ into two parts:
Let ‘Ec’ represent the observations made about the mark at the scene
Let ‘E d’ represent the observations made about test marks made from the suspect’s
shoe
The likelihood ratio [Equation 3] becomes:
? x ( E \ H P, l )  Pr(£r | / / ,„ / )  Vx{ED \ H  P, Ec , l )
Yr(E | H D, l )  Pr(£c | H D, l )  Pr(ED \ H D, Ec , l )  [Equati°n 4]
If some simplifying assumptions are made, then this becomes:
Pr(£ | H P, l )  1 Pr {ED \ H P, l )
¥ x( E \ H d , I )  Vx{Ec \ H dJ ) ' V x{Eu \ H dJ )  [Equat'°n5]
This analysis reveals that three sets of data are required to inform probabilities for the 
findings:
- footwear from people who have committed offences like the one in question 
(known as an ‘offender-related’ database);
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- footwear from people, like the suspect, who could be suspected of the 
offence but who are, in fact, innocent (a so-called ‘innocent suspects’ 
database)
- footwear marks found at the scene of similar crimes (a ‘crime-related’ 
database).
It may be that in some circumstances, and for certain evidence types, these sets would 
provide very similar estimates of the relative frequencies for the matching mark. If 
that were so, then the probabilities for the observations would be very similar and the 
right hand side of the extended likelihood ratio [Equation 5] would be equal to 1. The 
value of the ‘match’ is then given by the reciprocal of the frequency of occurrence of 
the matching mark at scenes o f similar crimes. In these particular circumstances, 
therefore, only one data set is required to evaluate the likelihood ratio. However, this 
would only be known if the scientist had gone through the process of identifying these 
data sets and checking if they provided significantly different estimates of the relative 
frequencies.
Champod, Jackson and Evett (2004) provided, for the first time, clear guidance on the 
collection and construction o f appropriate data sets to help scientists form and express 
more robust, reliable opinions.
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Chapter 8: A unifying view of the role of forensic science
Over the course of a large number of workshops and other opportunities with 
experienced practitioners, the Case Assessment and Interpretation (CAI) model was 
applied by the CAI development team (which included the current author) to the full 
range of main-stream forensic science disciplines from 1998 onwards. That 
experience led to a deeper understanding of the model’s suitability and its benefits and 
limitations. It also led to a novel view, and a formalisation, of the role of forensic 
science. From that, new insights were gained into the skills and knowledge required 
to perform the different aspects of that role. These developments were reported in a 
set of three papers that are the subject of this Chapter.
A paper by the current author (Jackson 2000; Appendix 6.1) reviewed the contribution 
that forensic science had made over the preceding sixty or so years, focussing 
particularly on how scientists had interpreted their findings and communicated their 
opinions. The limitations of various words and phrases used conventionally by 
scientists to express their conclusions were explored. A set of guiding principles was 
offered (page 85) that, in Jackson’s opinion, provided the framework to develop and 
improve the delivery of forensic science services: 
add value 
act impartially 
- be transparent
provide sustainable, robust evidence and be expert 
This framework was based on application of Bayesian inference and, in particular, on 
appraisal of a likelihood ratio as a logical means of assessing and presenting the 
significance of scientific findings.
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Several years later, this set of guiding principles was reflected in the standard 
procedure for offering evaluative opinion written by the Association of Forensic 
Science Providers (2009, page 161):
- balance
- logic
- transparency
- robustness
Focussing for the moment on the principle o f ‘balance’, the original version of the 
Case Assessment and Interpretation model required the scientist to define a pair of 
mutually exclusive propositions relevant to the case in question. For some 
practitioners and for some cases, this was a relatively straightforward task, 
particularly if the propositions were centred on source or sub-source level. However, 
there were many cases in which it was difficult to define propositions. Part of this 
difficulty seemed to be the inability of practitioners to understand what they were 
trying to achieve with their examinations. In a subsequent paper (Jackson et al. 2006; 
Appendix 6.2), the author o f this thesis provided a novel solution to the problem by 
suggesting that, prior to framing proposition s , practitioners should define the issues in 
the case from the viewpoint of the customers -  the police, prosecutors or defence. 
The introduction of this step helps the scientist to focus on the key issues in the case 
and helps therefore to direct the purpose of the examination.
The following example, based loosely on an actual case of murder, may help to 
illustrate this concept:
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The scene o f  the crim e is the home o f  an elderly m arried  couple who had  
suffered injuries that had b led  profusely leading to their death. A 
bloodsta ined tow el has been fou n d  a t the scene o f  a m urder and, from  other 
evidence, it is believed  that the tow el belonged to the house and had been used  
by the offender to w ipe up b lood  a t the scene. The p o lice  subm it the towel, 
together with relevant reference sam ples from  the deceased  and a suspect, 
with a request fo r  DNA analysis.
On first glance, it may seem obvious and straightforward in this case to develop a pair 
of sub-source propositions along the lines of:
Some of the DNA on the towel came from the suspect 
The DNA came from people other than, and unrelated to, the suspect 
If this were so, then interpretation o f the results of the analysis would also be 
relatively straightforward, requiring nothing more than an assessment of match 
probabilities for the likelihood ratio. However, if the scientist were to probe more 
deeply into the case, it may be that, through discussions with the customer, the case 
circumstances reveal that the suspect denies he is the offender but says he was in the 
house one week earlier and had handled the towel then. Clearly, the issue then is not 
about the origin of the DNA (sub-source level) but about whether the suspect handled 
the towel at the time of the offence or had handled it one week earlier (activity level). 
With this information, and following the guidance in the paper by Jackson et al. 
(2006), the scientist would proceed by specifying an appropriate, relevant issue at 
activity level such as:
- ‘Did the suspect handle the towel at the time of the offence rather than one 
week earlier?’
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Once the issue has been clarified, specified and agreed with the client, a pair of 
mutually exclusive propositions based on this activity-level issue can be developed:
- The suspect handled the towel at the time of the offence;
Someone else handled the towel at this time; the suspect handled it one week 
earlier.
Interpretation of the findings would then depend on consideration of the quantity, 
distribution and presence of mixtures of DNA-profiles, not solely on frequencies of 
occurrence or match probabilities, as would be the case if  the scientist stayed at sub­
source level. Furthermore, if  opinion were to be presented in this case at sub-source 
level, then the jury may well be misled into thinking that the DNA evidence was very 
powerful and compelling evidence for the guilt of the suspect. This concern, of vital 
significance for the effective administration of justice, was explored earlier in this 
thesis (Chapter 6.1).
A further, important contribution of the paper by Jackson et al. (2006) was to take 
forward the development of the distinction between the role of a forensic scientist as 
an ‘investigator’ and as an ‘evaluator’, a notion first aired by Evett et a l  (2000). As 
lead author, Jackson suggested that ‘investigators’ provide opinions that could be 
classified either as 1) explanations generated to explain the results of their 
examinations or 2) p o sterio r  p robab ilities  of propositions, after the results of the 
examination are known. In contrast, ‘evaluators’ provide likelihood ratios for the 
results of the tests or observations. For example, when the scientist is involved in the 
early stages of a case, such as at the scene of a crime, then they will be offering 
opinions such as - ‘Possible sources o f  the black fib res  recovered  from  the v ic tim ’s 
body include carpets and upholstery ’ (explanations), and ‘ The sea t o f  the f ire  is very
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likely to be the arm chair in the fa r  right-hand corner o f  the living-room  ’ (a posterior 
probability). When the case progresses and a suspect has been arrested, then the 
opinions given by the scientist would be an expression of a likelihood ratio, and 
would be phrased along the following lines -  ‘ The findings are fa r  m ore likely to be 
obta in ed  i f  the victim  h ad been transported  in the su sp ec t’s vehicle rather than in 
som e other, unknown vehicle \  or ‘ The findings prov ide  m oderate support fo r  the view  
it w as the suspect, rather than som eone else, who p o u red  p e tro l over the arm chair ’.
With the aim of understanding more deeply the nature of forensic science opinions, 
the paper by Jackson (2009; Appendix 6.3) offered a review and an exploration of the 
wide range of expressions commonly used by forensic scientists. A categorisation of 
these expressions following the ‘investigative’ or ‘evaluative’ structure (Jackson et al.
2006) was presented and it was suggested that, if  an opinion can be so classified, then 
the skills and knowledge required to give such an opinion can be defined.
For explanations, the skills and knowledge would include the ability to
1) generate a full range o f realistic hypotheses to account for the findings:
2) communicate the strengths and, more importantly, the limitations of such 
opinion.
For p o sterio r  p ro b a b ilities , the scientist should have the ability to
1) generate all relevant prior hypotheses;
2) assign realistic, fair prior probabilities for these hypotheses;
3) assign justifiable, robust likelihoods for the findings;
4) compute posterior probabilities;
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5) communicate clearly not only the opinion in the form of a posterior 
probability but also the justification of such an opinion.
For likelihood ra tios , the requirements would include:
1) the ability to define the issues that are relevant to the case;
2) the ability to translate these issues into appropriate propositions and 
alternatives based on the case circumstances;
3) the knowledge to help assign robust likelihoods for the findings;
4) the skills to explain what an opinion in the form of a likelihood ratio 
actually means and how such an opinion can be used by the triers of fact.
Not all of the words and phrases used by scientists fell easily into this structure, 
primarily because the words or phrases were of obscure or confused meaning. The 
recommendation in the paper was that use of these expressions in scientific language 
should be avoided.
This categorisation of opinions, together with the description of the skills and 
knowledge required to give those opinions, provided practitioners with a new way of 
checking the robustness of their opinions. It also gave the people who use expert 
services, i.e. police and lawyers, a framework they could use to challenge forensic 
science evidence and to check whether the expert’s opinion was justifiable.
This was a novel view of the role of forensic scientists and of the nature of the 
opinions that they provided. It helped clarify, for both providers and consumers, the
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contribution that forensic science makes to investigations and to the criminal justice
process.
It is difficult to know precisely what influence the concepts described within the three 
papers of this Chapter (and papers from other Chapters) had on the Association of 
Forensic Science Providers (AFSP) when they developed their standards for the 
formulation of evaluative opinion (Association of Forensic Science Providers 2009). 
However, the AFSP do make reference to at least one of the papers and there is much 
resonance in the language o f the AFSP document with that of the papers.
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Chapter 9: The current status of Case Assessment and Interpretation 
in Criminal Justice Systems.
The philosophical approach that underpins the process of Case Assessment and 
Interpretation is one of inductive, Bayesian inference. Generally, inference can be 
viewed as a very personal activity that depends on the specific thought-processes of 
the individual making the inference. It can be argued that, by applying the logical 
structure of inductive Bayesian inference contained within CAI, there is no room for 
individual variation in approach by scientists. However, there are a number of key 
steps within CAI that are subject to decisions that can only be made by the scientist 
using judgement. Some of these decisions can be influenced and controlled within the 
scientist’s domain. For example, decisions on assigning probabilities for scientific 
findings will depend on the scientist’s own knowledge, understanding and experience 
of the evidence type. However, other decisions will depend on factors outside the 
control and possible knowledge of the scientist. For example, definition of the issues 
to be addressed must be influenced by knowledge of the case circumstances but the 
scientist’s awareness of the circumstances will necessarily be limited. Furthermore, 
decisions on which items to select for examination may depend not only on the 
predicted evidential value but also on the constraints of the customer’s budget and 
deadlines if, as in England and Wales, there is a formal, commercial relationship 
between suppliers and customers. Even if  there is no such relationship, as in Scotland 
and the Republic of Ireland, there is still the pressure on suppliers of forensic science 
services to use their resources efficiently and economically.
Jackson and Jones (2009; Appendix 7.1) argue that effective application of CAI relies 
not only on the competence and expertise of the scientist but also on the active
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engagement and participation o f customers, in the widest sense, with the scientists 
providing the service. The overall aim of the CAI model was that of delivering a 
service meeting the needs of the Criminal Justice System. These needs can only be 
met if the needs are properly understood -  and this can only come from effective 
engagement of providers with customers. The authors argue that there are various 
constraints and barriers to such engagement and that these include:
poor communication, leading to misunderstandings between providers and 
users
insufficient time to assess needs
limited budgets to purchase forensic science service
inefficient or ineffective working practices in both provider and customer 
organisations
weak challenge and counter-balance to prosecution-commissioned forensic 
science
- customers’ focus on purchasing ‘commodities’ rather than ‘value-added’ 
services
the adversarial nature of the criminal justice system
The current commercial arrangements between police and forensic science providers 
in England and Wales, summarised in the National Forensic Framework Agreement 
(National Policing Improvement Agency 2010), are described by Lawless (2010; page 
16) as - ‘... tight controls surrounding the w ay in which fo ren sic  services are 
p r o v i d e d Lawless continues: “The notion o f  'partnership’ fo u n d  in the CAI 
literature is significantly under-represented here
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While the specific details of the National Agreement are somewhat difficult to obtain, 
anecdotal information suggests that, within this Agreement, the police can 
commission ‘source only’ products. If this were in fact true, then to do so runs the 
risk, at best, of wasting money and resources or, at worst, of providing misleading 
evidence.
Jackson and Jones (2009, page 11) argue that effective application of the principles of 
Case Assessment and Interpretation not only requires competent individual scientists 
and customers but also requires each organisation to have in place ‘supportive 
procedures’ that facilitate the process. Such procedures include excellent 
communication and common understanding between all the actors in the process, 
quality standards that assure competence, and the provision by supplier organisations 
o f data to assist the scientist. It remains to be seen, given the commercial pressures on 
suppliers to keep costs of ‘overheads’ such as research low, how suppliers will be able 
to meet this latter requirement of generating and providing useful data.
Finally, the authors provide a step-by-step checklist to guide scientists, and others, 
through the process o f applying the principles o f Case Assessment and Interpretation 
(CAI) in individual cases. Cook et al. (1998a) provided the original description of the 
CAI model, but the version in Jackson and Jones (2009) incorporated the subsequent 
developments and improvements of the hierarchy of issues and the classification of 
investigative and evaluative opinions. This approach provided, for the first time, a 
logical, unifying process for all forensic science practitioners.
71
Chapter 10: Summary and review
10.1 Introduction
It has been argued in this thesis that applying the Case Assessment and Interpretation 
model, with its underlying requirement to assess likelihood ratios, to the examination 
o f cases helps the forensic scientist, firstly, to make effective decisions on which 
items to examine and, secondly, to provide robust, balanced interpretations of the 
results of those examinations. This approach is set within the accompanying concepts 
o f the ‘hierarchy of issues’ and a Bayesian classification of expert opinions. 
Numerous examples of how the CAI model can be applied to casework are provided 
in the papers appended to this thesis and the reader is directed to these examples for 
illustration of the underlying concepts and the value of the approach. In particular, 
the case example -  ‘A Simple Transfer Case’ -  presented in the paper by Jackson and 
Jones (2009; Appendix 7.1) walks the reader through the key stages of the CAI model 
and illustrates both qualitative and quantitative aspects of the model.
While the case studies provided in the appended papers illustrate the application and 
the benefit of the approach, further demonstration of the usefulness o f CAI can be 
achieved through revisiting the cases described in Chapter 2 and assessing the impact 
that CAI may have had in those cases. At the end of the Chapter, there is a discussion 
of two more recent cases in which consideration of a likelihood ratio did have a 
significant impact on the eventual outcome of the case.
The process of Case Assessment and Interpretation can be summarised by the 
following steps, based on the ‘checklist’ provided by Jackson and Jones (2009):
1. Define the customer requirement
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- the provider makes efforts to understand the case circumstances, the 
allegations and the uncertainties.
2. Assess how forensic science can help
- the provider assesses the most likely outcomes, and their potential 
evidential value (likelihood ratio) or investigative value, for the different 
examinations that could be undertaken and advises the customer 
accordingly.
3. Agree on a case examination strategy
following informed conversations between the customer and provider, an 
agreement is reached on which items to examine with which tests.
4. Carry out the agreed strategy
5. Interpret the results
if  evaluative, consider and refine likelihood ratios 
if  investigative, consider explanations or posterior probabilities
6. Communicate
convey clearly the conclusion as it relates to the original purpose of the 
examination
With the historic cases to be revisited here, it is impossible to carry out all the steps in 
this process. The main focus, instead, will be a consideration of whether the issues 
were investigative or evaluative and, if  the latter, what would have been appropriate 
pairs of propositions and what weight of evidence might have been provided?
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10.2 The case of John (Jack) Preece
In the discussion of this case in Chapter 2 (see 2.2.7.), several questions were raised 
about how the scientist could have proceeded. One of these questions was ‘... exactly 
how should experts give evidence in an unbiased manner?’ How might the CAI 
model have helped in this respect?
In the first instance, the CAI model would have directed the scientist to understand 
the issues in the case and, from these, construct pairs of propositions that reflected the 
respective positions of the prosecution and defence. For greatest value to the court, it 
has been proposed that these propositions should be at activity-level. However, given 
the lack of detail of the specific circumstances of this particular case, this thesis will 
retreat to source-level and suggest a pair of propositions that is generic to many cases 
of this type:
Hp - the semen came from Mr Preece
Hd - the semen came from someone other than Mr Preece 
(where Hp represents the prosecution allegation and Hd the alternative argument)
If this pair of propositions had been adopted in the case, then the next step, following 
the CAI model, would have been to evaluate a likelihood ratio for the findings in 
relation to ‘grouping’ tests. The key issue at the trial was whether or not any group 
over and above that of the female victim’s own group had been detected in the mixed 
seminal and vaginal staining from the victim. The original, prosecution-commissioned 
expert in the case asserted that he had detected reactions for group A that were not 
attributable to the victim herself, who was also of group A, but could be attributed to 
the semen present in the staining. Other experts giving evidence at the Appeal 
hearing had the opposite view -  no group attributable to the offender (whoever that
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may have been) could be discerned from the results. Instead of engaging in an 
argument about which expert opinion is correct, or which expert is to be believed, a 
probabilistic approach to the evaluation of the findings could have proceeded in the 
following way.
Let ‘A’ represent the detection of group A.
Let T  represent all the conditioning background information influencing assignment 
of probabilities.
The weight of evidence provided by the detection of group A would be given by the 
likelihood ratio (from Equation 2):
Pr(A | H p, l )  
? r ( A \ H D, l ) [Equation 6]
However, the uncertainty over whether or not the group A that was detected actually 
came from the offender (whoever that may have been) has to be accommodated in this 
formulation of the likelihood ratio. This uncertainty can be modelled in the following 
way:
Let ‘O’ represent the event of an offender’s group (whatever that was) being detected 
in the mixed staining.
Let ‘NO’ represent the event of an offender’s group not being detected in the mixed 
staining. The values of the probabilities of these two events would be complementary 
and would have been informed by factors such as the relative quantities of semen and 
vaginal material present in the mixture, together with the degree of expert knowledge 
on the detection of groups in such mixtures.
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The likelihood ratio [Equation 6] can be extended as follows:
{Pr[NO|HP,I] x  Pr [A|HP,NO,I]} + {Pr[0|HP,I] X Pr [A|HP,0,I]} 
{Pr[NO|HD, I] x  Pr [A|HD,NO,I]} + {Pr[0|HDf I] X Pr [A|HD,0,I]}
[Equation 7]
On the assumption that Mr Preece was no different from other potential offenders in 
his propensity to having his group detected, the term Pr[NO|Hp,l] in the numerator 
would be equal to the equivalent term in the denominator, Pr[NO|HD,I]. The 
probability can therefore be written as Pr[NO|I] and constitutes the critical issue that 
was argued at the Court of Appeal -  how likely was it that the group of the offender, 
whoever he may have been, was discernible in the results? The decision made by the 
Court on this issue, based on the expert evidence that they heard, was that it was 
certain (probability 1) that no offender group was detected. However, let us assume 
maximum uncertainty for the probability Pr[NO|I] and assign a value of 0.5. As the 
events ‘O’ and ‘NO’ are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, it follows that Pr[0 |I] 
must also have a value of 0.5.
The term Pr [A|Hp,NO, I] can be assigned a value of 1 because, on the conditioning 
that the offender’s group had not been detected and that the victim is of group A, it is 
practically certain, barring experimental and human error, that group A would have 
been detected. If the offender’s group had been detected, and that offender was Mr 
Preece, then it is practically certain that group A would have been detected, given Mr 
Preece was of group A. The term [A|HP, 0 ,1] could then be assigned a value of 1.
Turning now to the denominator, a value of 0.5 could be assigned for the terms 
Pr[NO|HD,I] and P r[0 |H D,I], following the argument earlier. If no offender’s group 
had been detected, and because the victim was group A, it would be practically certain
76
that group A would have been detected: the term Pr[A|HD,NO, I] would equal 1. If 
the offender’s group had in fact been detected, but this offender was not Mr Preece, 
then the term Pr [A|HD,0 ,I] would be a function of the occurrence of group A in a 
relevant population of people who could be suspected as being the source of the 
semen. On the assumption that the UK Caucasian population was the relevant 
population, then a probability of 0.4 could be assigned for this term, based on the 
approximate proportion of group A in this population.
Substituting the values as described for the probabilities, the likelihood ratio 
[Equation 7] becomes:
{0.5 x 1} + {0.5 x  1}
{0.5 x 1} +  {0.5 x 0.4}
[Equation 8]
which reduces to:
to give a likelihood ratio of approximately 1.4.
[Equation 9]
The effect of this magnitude of likelihood ratio would be to multiply the prior odds of 
the semen having come from Mr Preece by a factor of approximately 1.4. Following 
the current verbal convention for expressing the likelihood ratio as a strength of 
support (Evett 200b), this would be described as limited (or weak) support for the 
prosecution proposition over the defence proposition. Whichever way the grouping 
results are viewed, most would agree that, given a likelihood ratio of 1.4, the evidence 
is of very limited value and should have been reported as such by the original expert.
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10.3 The case of Judith Ward
The question was posed in the discussion of this case (see 2.2.2) whether, at the time 
of the original examination, there was a more acceptable, more logical and robust 
guiding structure for forming forensic science opinion. The answer to the question is 
yes, there was a logical structure available, but it was not widely known among, and 
certainly not taught to, main-stream forensic science practitioners. Had it been 
known, how might the experts have improved their interpretation in this case?
The first improvement would have been in the phrasing of opinions. Wide variation 
in the way opinions were expressed was apparent in the judgment16. Examples 
included:
'... consistent with the opinion that contact o f  the hands with an explosive  
substance could have occurred ’
'... consistent w ith the opinion that contact o f  the inside o f  the bag  and  
com m ercial explosive has p rob a b ly  occurred'
'... results sh ow ed that M iss W ard had p rob a b ly  been in contact with a 
com m ercial explosive'
i ... M iss W ard must have kneaded explosives. ’
The word ‘contact’ has a multitude of meanings and could be described as ‘pseudo- 
activity’ level (Evett et al. 2000a) -  essentially, the evaluation of the weight of 
evidence would follow a source-level appraisal while giving an appearance, falsely, of 
appraisal at activity-level. The CAI model encourages the scientist to phrase issues 
and propositions at activity-level in order to focus, and make clear, the basis of their
16 Ward (n 6).
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interpretation. As with the previous case of Mr Preece, the precise circumstances and 
allegations in this case are not known to the current author and it is impossible to 
know what would have been more relevant phrasing, at ‘activity-level’, in this case. 
However, for illustration purposes only, some assumptions on the circumstances will 
be made and examples of improved phrasing for the issues in this case can be 
suggested on this basis. The following are just some examples of the issues that may 
have been relevant and appropriate to this case:
- whether or not Ms Ward planted the explosive device(s) (activity-level)
whether or not Ms Ward kneaded explosives 60 hours before her hands were 
swabbed (activity-level based on the time of the last bombing incident) 
whether or not the traces on her hands came from the devices’ explosive 
(source-level)
Pairs of relevant propositions could be generated from these issues, taking into 
account the prosecution allegations and the defence assertions. Probabilities for the 
findings given the truth of these propositions, and given any conditioning information, 
could be assigned. The robustness of these probabilities would depend on the 
scientist’s knowledge and expertise but, as the current author does not have expert 
knowledge of explosives, no realistic probabilities can be offered here. However, 
based on evidence presented to the Court of Appeal17, it could be argued that the 
likelihood ratios would not have been too informative and, had the opinion been 
presented in the form of an expression of likelihood ratios, or in the form of 
investigative opinions with suitable riders about their limitations, then there would 
have been less risk of the jury at the original trial being mislead.
17 Ward (n 6).
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If the scientist had had available the classification of opinions (Jackson 2009), he 
would have had the framework to recognise that the opinion of “ ... results sh ow ed  
that M iss W ard had p rob a b ly  been in contact with a com m ercial explosive ” was a 
posterior probability for a proposition. Posterior probabilities for propositions either 
should not be offered at all or, with the knowledge and permission of the court, should 
be offered with a rider about assumptions and limitations.
The opinion ‘... M iss Ward m ust have kneaded exp losives’ would have been 
recognized by the scientist as an unjustifiable, categoric, posterior probability and 
would not have been given.
The case o f Judith Ward provides a good example where a clearer distinction between 
investigative opinions and evaluative opinions, as proposed by Jackson et al. (2006), 
would have helped all concerned (scientists, police, lawyers, jury) to appraise the 
scientific results in a more balanced, robust way. There appeared to be traces of 
explosives on a number of different items from various sources relating to Judith 
Ward. In investigative mode, the scientist could have offered explanations for these 
traces but would have had to ensure that these explanations were not biased one way 
or the other and that they were exhaustive as far as was feasible. It would have been 
necessary for the scientist to have stressed the list of explanations was not truly 
exhaustive and to have pointed out that no opinion was being offered on the 
probability of explanations that had been put forward.
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10.4 The case of the ‘Birmingham Six’18
This case raised again the question of how the expert could have presented his 
findings in a more reliable, more robust, more acceptable way (see 2.2.3). The 
scientist was reported as giving an opinion that he was ninety-nine percent certain that 
Mr Power and Mr Hill had been in contact with commercial explosives (Mullin C.
1990). Following the models provided by Evett et al. (2000b) and Jackson et al. 
(2006), this could be classified as an ‘investigative’ opinion in the form of a posterior 
probability at ‘pseudo-activity’ level. Putting aside the problem with the word 
‘contact’, the main concerns with opinions expressed as posterior probabilities are 
opacity and possible bias - opacity because the prior probabilities have not been 
exposed; possible bias because the prior probabilities could be unjustifiably weighted 
towards the prosecution (or defence) proposition.
As with the Judith Ward case mentioned earlier, the precise circumstances and 
allegations in the Birmingham Six case are not known to the current author and it is 
impossible to know what would have been more relevant, ‘activity-level’ phrasing of 
propositions in this case. However, again for illustration purposes only, some 
assumptions on the circumstances will be made and examples of improved phrasing 
for the issues in this case can be suggested on this basis. The following are just some 
examples of the issues that may have been relevant and appropriate to this case:
whether or not Mr Power planted one of the explosive devices (activity-level) 
whether or not Mr Power kneaded explosives approximately 20 hours before 
his hands were swabbed (activity-level based on an assumption on the time 
interval between assembling the device and swabbing)
18 Mcllkenny (n 12).
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- whether or not the traces on his hands came from the device’s explosive 
(source-level)
Again, as in the Judith Ward case, clarity between investigative opinion and 
evaluative opinion would have been helpful. If evaluative issues had been discussed 
and agreed prior to the trial, opinions based on appraisal of likelihood ratios could 
have been offered and the impact of conditioning information ‘I’ on the probabilities 
for the findings would have been recognised and accommodated. Opinions founded 
on this type of appraisal would have helped the court by providing more balanced, 
more robust evidence. Alternatively, in investigative mode, explanations for the 
findings could have been put forward, along with a clear warning that a list of 
explanations is not exhaustive nor is there any probability attached to the truth of the 
explanations. Included in that list should have been reasons why apparently positive 
reactions would have been obtained from hand swabs given the alternative proposition 
that the defendants had not handled explosive.
10.5 The case of Stefan Kiszko
It has been argued earlier (see 2.2 .4) that the issue in this case was one of profoundly 
poor interpretation of the value of the scientific findings and that, if  the scientist 
involved had had a robust interpretational model, then perhaps he would not have 
presented evidence that was used to convince the jury that an innocent man had 
committed a serious crime. It was suggested that, probably, the scientist had simply 
presented his finding of the presence of semen on the clothing, without mention of the 
significance of the absence of spermatozoa in Mr Kiszko’s semen. It is perhaps 
trivial, given the current knowledge and awareness among most practitioners about
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robust interpretation, to apply CAI thinking to this case but doing so will highlight 
situations in which categorical opinions may be given.
The issue in the case can be stated at ‘source-level’, as in the P reece  case mentioned 
earlier:
H p - the semen came from Mr Kiszko
Hq - the semen came from someone other than Mr Kiszko 
If Hp were true, then the probability of finding semen containing spermatozoa would 
be zero, according to the medical and other evidence that was adduced at the Appeal19 
and that was available at the original trial. Accordingly, whatever value would be 
assigned to the probability for these findings given the truth of the alternative 
proposition Hd, the likelihood ratio would always turn out to be zero, and the 
posterior probability for Hp would therefore be zero -  the prosecution hypothesis is 
not true.
Applying CAI may seem an overly complicated way of dealing with the scientific 
evidence in this case - it is probably obvious to even lay-people that Mr Kiszko could 
not be the donor of the semen at the scene. However, application of a likelihood ratio 
approach can underpin all assessments of expert evidence and should be the bedrock 
of all experts’ thinking.
X9 Kiszko (n 14) 10F.
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10.6 The case of Barry George20
Mr George was convicted in the year 2000 of the murder in 1999 of Jill Dando. One 
of the three main strands of the prosecution case at Mr George’s trial21 23was the 
presence of a single particle of firearms discharge residue (FDR) in a pocket of a coat 
belonging to Mr George. Mr George’s first appeal against conviction failed. But a 
second appeal was allowed after his case had been reviewed by the Criminal Case 
Review Commission (CCRC). The CCRC had commissioned a report into the FDR 
evidence and, on the basis of the findings in that report, Mr George’s case returned to 
the Court of Appeal.
Many of the opinions expressed by scientists at original trial about the FDR evidence 
can be classified, following the scheme proposed by Jackson (2004), as ‘explanations’ 
at source-level, e.g ‘...consistent with having com e from  the cartridge used in the 
k illin g ’'. There was also considerable discussion at that trial about the probability of
‘secondary contamination’, i.e. the FDR having arisen not through the act of firing the 
gun but through transfer via an intermediary. Some of the phrases used to convey 
opinions about this issue could possibly be seen as ‘posterior probabilities’ at activity- 
level, e.g. ‘ ...it w as equally unlikely that it was the resu lt o f  the appellant fir in g  a gun 
a y e a r  before’. No record could be found at the original trial of an appraisal of a 
likelihood ratio for the FDR findings.
The Court at the second appeal focussed primarily on the interpretation and 
communication of the value of the firearms discharge residue. The Court appeared to 
be persuaded that the approach to assessing the weight of evidence provided by the
20 R  v  B a r r y  G e o r g e  [2007] EWCA Crim 2722.
21 ibid 46.
22 ibid 9.
23 ibid 39.
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FDR result was through consideration of a likelihood ratio at activity-level, as 
described in the CCRC report. The Court said ‘ The m ost significant (fresh) evidence  
that w e have received  ow es its origin to the initiative o f  D r Ian E vett . . ,24, adding 
later:
...D r E vett w as in the course o f  developing with co llea g u es ..... a technique called
C ase A ssessm ent and Interpretation (CAI). The object o f  this is to clarify before 
evidence is exam ined and analysed the likelihood o f  the examination achieving  
particu lar results on two different hypotheses or propositions. This technique 
fa cilita tes the draw ing o f  appropriate conclusions from  the results actually 
obtained on the examination.
The two propositions that Dr Evett said he and the FDR expert considered in 
discussions after the original trial were:
H p -  the appellant was the man who shot Jill Dando 
Hd - the appellant was not the man who shot Jill Dando24 56 27
The FDR expert went on to assign values of approximately 1 in 100 for the 
probability of the findings if  either of the propositions were in fact true. As the 
numerator and denominator of the likelihood ratio are of the same broad value, the 
likelihood ratio for the findings would be equal to 1 and, as concluded in a Forensic 
Science Service (FSS) report commissioned by the CCRC, ‘p rovides no assistance to
27anyone asked to ju d g e  which proposition  is true \
24 G e o r g e  (n 20) 14.
25 ibid 16.
26 ibid 17. Note that this pair o f propositions has been developed from an ‘activity-level’ issue.
27 ibid 23.
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Had the FDR evidence been appraised along these lines originally, and if  the case had 
gone before a jury, then the jury would have heard that the FDR evidence was 
essentially neutral, providing no assistance on whether it was Mr George or some 
other person who had fired the gun that killed Jill Dando.
The Court of Appeal ruled that the verdict was unsafe and that the conviction would 
be quashed. Mr George’s case went to a retrial and, at that trial, the FDR results were 
not admitted as evidence despite the prosecution’s attempt to adduced the evidence. 
The jury subsequently found Mr George not guilty of murder.
This case is a clear example of the strength and benefit of the T  part - Interpretation - 
of the ‘CAI model’. Whether there would have been benefits from the 4A’ part of 
‘CAT - the Assessment phase -  in this case is debatable. However, it can be seen 
from the expert’s evidence to the Court of Appeal that the most likely outcome 
(probability o f 0.99) of examination of the coat, given the truth of either proposition, 
would have been no particles. Again, as the numerator and denominator would be of 
equal value (0.99), the likelihood ratio for finding no particles would be of value 1 
and therefore of no evidential weight. Therefore, had the expert pre-assessed 
examination of the coat for FDR, then he would have predicted that the most likely 
outcomes of the examinations were no or a few particles, with both outcomes being of 
no evidential weight. Whether or not the police or prosecution, given this assessment, 
would still have requested the examination is unknown. It may well have been that 
the police would indeed have requested the examination for investigative purposes 
and, if  that were so, then the opinion from the expert should have been in the form of 
investigative opinions, i.e. a list of ‘explanations’. This approach is recommended in
86
... the FSS has a dop ted  a cautious approach to reporting L O W  levels o f  
residue and no evidential value can be offered.
From an investigative p o in t o f  view, L O W  levels o f  residue m ay nonetheless 
have som e value; f o r  example, fin d in g  a L O W  level on a d iscarded  item such  
as a g love may g ive  a significant lead  to a p o lice  investigation. When an 
officer is g iven information on L O W  levels in an investigative submission, he 
must be made aw are that in m ost cases it is unlikely any evidential w eight can
■JQbe attached to the finding.
10.7 The case of R v T28 9
Despite the Court of Appeal in the Barry George case appearing to endorse a 
‘likelihood ratio approach’ to the evaluation of scientific evidence, the judgment 
handed down in the more recent case of R v T appears to have taken an opposite view.
The Court made numerous, mainly adverse, comments on the use of likelihood ratios 
and Bayes’ Theorem. The key complaint of the Court would seem to revolve around 
the availability of relevant and reliable data to inform the probabilities of a likelihood 
ratio and, while the case involved comparison of footwear marks, the Court’s ruling 
could be interpreted as applicable to other forms of expert evidence. The Court 
compared the availability of data in the field of DNA with that for footwear marks and 
commented that:
another FSS document (‘The assessment, interpretation and reporting of firearms
chemistry cases’) that was quoted in the judgment:
28 G e o r g e  (n 20) 21
29 R  v r [2 0 1 0 ] EWCA Crim 2439.
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The m ost in our ju dgm en t that can be derived  from  a com parison o f  pattern  
and size  (o f  fo o tw ear marks) is that it can form  p a r t o f  the judgm en t on how  
common the pattern  or size  is. It is im possible to see on the p resen t sta te  o f  
information how any m athem atical fig u re  can be prop erly  calculated  to 
express a m ore definitive evaluative opinion — there are fa r  too many
“XC\variables and uncertainties in the data.
These comments reflect the problem of misunderstanding between, on the one hand, 
experts who are trying to apply logical inference when forming opinions and, on the 
other hand, the legal profession who have the difficult task of incorporating expert 
opinion into an overall view of the weight of the totality of the evidence. The Court 
in R v T appeared to view the evaluation of a likelihood ratio as a strictly 
mathematical process that can only be used where there are precise, sufficient data. It 
may be that the Court did not understand the nature of subjective probabilities, and 
their use in dealing with uncertainty, and that this may have been due to a failure on 
the part of the expert witnesses in this case to explain this concept adequately for the 
Court. While the Court did talk about ‘how common a pattern  or size  i s ’ in the 
previous quote, and also referred to the use of a ‘sta tistica l d a ta b a se ’ in glass 
evidence , they fail to show how these data can be used logically and coherently to 
form an evaluation of the weight of the findings. The only guidance given, referring 
to glass evidence, was:
...an expert can g ive  an opinion using a sta tistica l database by sim ply using  
that database and expressing an opinion by reference to it, without recourse to 301
30 R v T ( n  29) 85.
31 ibid 91.
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the type o f  m athem atical form ula used in this case or to any form  o f  Bayes ’ 
Theorem .'32 34
This comment begs the question - how should the expert use the data? In that respect, 
the judgment is quite opaque.
It is also very difficult to understand why this judgment is quite dismissive of the 
positive comments by the same Court on the use of likelihood ratios by Dr Evett in 
the B arry G eorge case:
It is apparent ... that D r  E vett was using a likelihood ratio approach, as 
advoca ted  by him in the p ap ers to which w e have referred. H owever, L ord  
P hillips C J (in g iv ing  the judgm en t o f  the court) d id  not consider the m erits o f  
the approach in the judgm en t or how it w as consistent with the view s 
expressed in Adams, D oheny and Adam s (No2). It appears sim ply to have 
fo rm ed  p a r t o f  the background to the court's consideration o f  the overall 
evidence in the case.
This is in striking comparison with the comment in the B arry G eorge judgment- ‘The 
m ost significant evidence that w e have received ow es its origin to the initiative o f  D r  
Ian E v e tt . . . ,34
Redmayne et al. (2011), Evett (2011) and Berger (2011) all provide critique and 
comment on the R v  T judgment and all emphasise the logical, robust approach to the 
evaluation o f the weight of expert evidence provided by an assessment of a likelihood
n R v T {  n 29)91.
33 ibid 90.
34 G eorge  (n 24) 14.
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ratio. It remains to be seen if  the R v T  judgment will be an influential judgment on 
the admissibility of expert evidence, or whether subsequent judgments will present a 
more soundly-based argument.
10.8 Case assessment
So far in this Chapter, the emphasis has been on the Interpretational aspects of CAI; 
the Assessment phase o f CAI has only briefly been mentioned. This reflects the 
emphasis that the Criminal Justice System currently has on outcomes of prosecutions 
and the central role that interpretation of expert findings plays in some cases. When 
the CAI model was first promulgated, it was in response partly to the requirement to 
provide value-for-money services in forensic science. The model facilitates the 
making of rational decision, prior to any substantive work being undertaken, in those 
cases in which there are choices to be made about the items to examine and the 
techniques to deploy.
In recent years, there has been a trend towards customers asking for forensic science 
services in a far more prescriptive way. Such requests may specify:
1) which items to examine
2) which tests to use
3) only source or sub-source level issues to be addressed.
The risk associated with these situations are, respectively,
1) examination of items that have not been submitted may provide stronger 
evidence in favour of either the prosecution or defence;
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2) the potential benefits o f other tests may be outside the knowledge of the 
customer;
3) opinion given at source or sub-source levels may be completely misleading 
when issues at higher levels (activity and offence) are being considered. The 
risk is double-sided: evidence that is evaluated as weak at source-level may in 
fact be stronger when considered at activity-level and, alternatively, evidence 
that is viewed as strong at source-level may in fact be much weaker at activity- 
level. In the first situation, the risk is that of guilty defendants being found not 
guilty because the scientific evidence is falsely weak; in the second situation, 
the risk is one of falsely convicting defendants when there is, in reality, 
insufficient evidence (e.g. as in the Barry George case).
Making decisions in-force on which items to submit or which tests to commission is 
probably viewed as the better option by the police as it gives them total control of 
submissions and budgets. Furthermore purchasing services at source and sub-source 
level is seen by customers as the more economic option. Activity-level services may 
involve more time and effort on the part of the provider and so are more expensive in 
the short term.
The CAI model encourages engagement of customers and providers in the 
Assessment phase in order to discuss, understand and agree an examination strategy 
that best meets the needs of the issues in the case. This is a sophisticated, business­
like relationship that requires an element of trust on both sides of the transaction. It 
may be argued that, for whatever reasons, a low level of trust has developed since the
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In the long term, there is a price to pay for miscarriages o f justice that is not currently 
included in any computations o f value-for-money. Arguably, the situation can only 
get worse unless there is a strong counter-balance from effective defence challenge or 
from effective regulation. Neither of these counter-balances seems to be particularly 
strong, either currently or for the foreseeable future, with consequent implications for 
continuing miscarriages of justice.
introduction of the commercial market in England and Wales and that this has led to
the situation of prescriptive requests from customers.
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Conclusions
The hypothesis o f this thesis has been stated as:
The evaluation o f  a B ayesian likelihood ratio p rov ides a ph ilosophical and  
p ra c tica l m odel to accom m odate the poten tia lly  conflicting requirem ents o f  
the crim inal ju s tice  system  fo r  reliable, useful, expert opinion and o f  
custom ers f o r  economic, expert services.
A collection of papers has been presented in support of this hypothesis. The papers 
cover a period from 1998 to 2009 and provide an insight into the history o f the 
development, firstly, of a basic, philosophical approach to assessment of a case and 
interpretation of evidence and, secondly, of the new insights gained from application 
of the model to various types of evidence and case.
Cook et al. (1998a) described for the first time a framework, called the Case 
Assessment and Interpretation (CAI) model, designed to guide scientists in making 
rational decisions in the face of pressures to use resources wisely and to deliver robust 
opinions.
The papers by Cook et al. (1998b), Evett, Jackson and Lambert (2000) and Cook et al. 
(1999) built on the basic model for Case Assessment and Interpretation (CAI). The 
novel notion of a hierarchy of propositions, the new distinction between explanations 
and propositions, and the logical interpretation of two-way transfer evidence that were 
described in these papers all gave fresh insight into the role and contribution of the 
forensic scientist.
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The logical process of thought and of action that is captured by the CAI model can be 
translated into a logical structure for writing reports and statements of evidence. This 
structure was described in the paper by Evett et al. (2000a) and has influenced the 
way in which the main providers of forensic science in the United Kingdom, Republic 
of Ireland and parts of Europe write their reports and statements.
Application of the CAI approach to DNA-profiling and to drugs cases (Evett e t al. 
2002, Booth, Johnson and Jackson 2002) revealed new ways of appraising the value 
of these evidence types and, thereby, of presenting more reliable opinion to courts of 
law.
Clarity to the type of background data that are required to help experts interpret their 
findings robustly and justifiably was provided by the analysis of Champod, Evett and 
Jackson (2004). The paper provided for the first time a structured, logical framework 
within which to collect data rather than the somewhat a d  hoc methods that had been 
formerly employed.
Jackson (2000), Jackson e t al. (2006) and Jackson (2009) presented further 
development of the notion that there is a basic philosophical difference between the 
opinions offered by experts operating as ‘investigators’ or as ’evaluators’. This notion 
that there were two distinct roles for experts provided, for the first time, a clarity, both 
for the experts themselves and for their customers, on the contribution made by 
experts to the criminal justice process.
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Finally, the paper by Jackson and Jones (2009) considered the application of CAI in 
the changing environment o f commercial, and other, pressures and discussed some of 
the changes that would be necessary in order to maximise the benefits of CAI.
The papers that form the body of this thesis have been well received in the forensic 
science community, some having gained European recognition for their contribution 
to the development of forensic science, and are frequently quoted in the forensic 
science literature and in courts of law.
However, one recent judgment in the Court of Appeal (the case of R v T) has cast 
doubt on the admissibility of opinions based on likelihood ratios. Furthermore, 
commercial pressures on the police and other parties involved in the investigation of 
crime and in the prosecution and defence of people accused of crime run the risk of 
short-term approaches to decision-making that do not capitalise on the benefits of 
applying CAI.
On the other hand, the successful appeal of B arry G eorge was largely due to a more 
robust appraisal of the weight of the evidence provided by a likelihood ratio approach. 
The standards published by the Association of Forensic Science Providers (AFSP 
2009), a body comprising the main providers of forensic science in the UK and the 
Republic of Ireland, are based on the concepts described in the papers. The National 
Academy of Sciences in the United States of America has made recent, positive 
reference to some of the published papers.
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It is this author’s opinion that a ‘likelihood ratio approach’, because of its inherent 
logical structure, will not be displaced easily. Forensic science practitioners and 
lawyers who appreciate its benefits will keep CAI development alive, despite the 
trends or pressures not to do so, but only time will tell if the long-term benefits of CAI 
will be realised.
On balance, there is significant evidence to support the stated hypothesis.
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